The next chapter is titled “Soviet Union” (Sowjetunion), and begins with “Morgenröte der Befreiung“ (The dawn of liberation). It is well worth the effort to go into this before continuing with the plight of German POWs, this time in the Soviet Union (SU), for it lays the foundation for what happened to Germans who fell into the hands of the Red Army, soldiers and civilians alike.

To reiterate yet again, the publishing of the book was brought about because of the lies – concerning the conduct of German soldiers – emanating from the communist countries before the 1975 thirtieth anniversary of the defeat of “Fascism”. When the Organization of Repatriates (Organisation der Heimkehrer [Organization]) asked the German Chancellor to stop this defamation of the former soldiers, to set the record straight based on the material amassed (see Part I), the Polish news agency PAP wrote on April 26, 1975 that this defamation is an invention by revanchist organizations in an effort to rehabilitate the German armed forces (Verbrechen der Sieger, p. 169). The paper continued to say that the Organization is comprised of officers and soldiers who, because of their conduct in the war – ‘to put it mildly’ – had to remain a little longer in the POW camps. But, so the Organization, those soldiers did not need to be rehabilitated, their conduct was, for the most part, beyond approach. And, most of them, kept under horrendous conditions, were released only because the German government promised the reinstitution of diplomatic ties with Moscow (p. 170).

But nonetheless, in April 1975, “Novosti”, a Russian news service, saw the need to refute “the old stories about atrocities committed on German POWs” by publishing the USSR Decree Concerning Prisoners of War of July 1, 1941. No need to go into this, it promised POWs heaven on earth but was totally ignored by the Russian camp authorities, if they were even aware of it. Same for the POWs, if anyone of them would have known about this Ukase and asked guards to adhere to it, he would most likely have been shot on the spot (p.171). In fact, the publishing of those rules, which were ignored in Toto, was an insult to the 1.1 million German POWs who – under horrendous conditions – perished in Soviet camps. Even the – never published – documentation compiled by Germans could never tell the whole story because Russian archives remain locked, with good reason (p.176).

Russian soldiers were saturated with hatred for Germans. This is of course no excuse for the atrocities committed on POWs and civilians alike, but it was the Soviet authorities that had their commissars and the like preach hatred. The Jew Ilja Ehrenburg was one of them, just one example of what he had to say: “There is nothing as beautiful as a German corpse. Kill the Germans! – your old mother begs you, kill the Germans! – your child pleads. Germans are not humans, they are wild beasts” (p.177).

In an interview with “Sowjetunion heute“ (Today’s Soviet Union), a glossy magazine published by the Soviet Embassy in Bonn, Pantelejemon Ponomarenko, the Red Army general in charge of partisan activities, stated that his partisans killed, wounded or imprisoned 1.5 million German soldiers and support staff (with imprisonment equal to a death sentence in most cases). The general forgot to mention anything about partisan warfare, the butchering by them, the authors refer the reader to a book by the Latvian officer Valdis Redelis “Partisanenkrieg…”, I’ve ordered the book and will follow up on this. Germans did react to partisan brutalities, but it was the partisans who initiated it and the “Commissar Order”, which in most cases did not even reach the troops, had nothing to do with the reprisal measures taken, they were taken out of necessity (p. 178). Ponomarenko, in that interview, identified communism as the ‘core’ of the partisan movement, and it is no secret that Jews had invented communism. The German leadership knew all of this and no doubt Jews were looked at closely in the occupied territories. For good reason, for not only were Jews “carriers of the Bolshevik idea”, they were also “leaders of the partisan movement” (R. Aschenauer, Krieg ohne Grenzen, Druffel-Verlag, 1982, p. 252). “Where there are partisans, there are Jews, and where there are Jews, there are partisans” (F.W. Seidler, Die Wehrmacht im Partisanenkrieg, Pour le Mérite-Verlag für Militärgeschichte, 1999, p. 124).

“Jews in the work camps sabotaged guns and other products they were making for the Germans.

Partisans with ammunition blew up thousands of Nazi supply trains, making it harder for the Germans to fight the war. In Lithuania, Jewish partisans were responsible for significant damage to Nazi trains.. Partisans also destroyed numerous Nazi power plants and factories, and focused their attention on other military and strategic targets, not on civilians.” http://www.jewishpartisans.org/t_switch.php?pageName=what+is+what+2

The thousands of Nazi supply trains part is probably an exaggeration, left over from the time when Jews bragged about their involvement in illegal warfare. This has now all but disappeared, Jews are to be seen as innocent victims.

On June 29, 1941, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, the de facto ruling body, issued the order for the organization of partisan units, so-called diversion groups, with Ponomarenko later appointed as commander (p. 179). Stalin publicized this order in his radio address of July 3, 1941. Following this, men who could handle weapons, but also woman were recruited, Children also joined, see Part II (p. 180).

To be successful, and to ensure cooperation, the partisans also terrorized the population. Anyone suspected of collaborating with the Germans was killed, because the population was at first friendly toward the Germans, as those who were part of the eastern campaign know (p.180). This changed when the partisans unleashed their terror against the populace. When they entered a village they immediately killed the village elder, then they locked the family into the house and burned it down. The villagers fled into the forest, but when discovered by the partisans they were killed. The partisans left mountains of bodies behind, as well as distraught woman and horrendous destruction (p. 181). And to be sure, all of those killed by the partisans were no doubt also blamed on the Germans. And as attacks by partisans on civilians were carried out with partisans at times doubtlessly wearing German uniforms, hatred towards Germans was the result, which was part of what was intended.

The Ukrainian partisan chief Fjedorov (no first name provided) bragged that they had killed more than 25,000 Germans and derailed 683 trains transporting soldiers and war material. In a radio address he gave instructions as to how to kill a German guard. Sneak up to him and kill him with a strike to the head, using an axe. All of it has to be done quickly to prevent him from crying out. Fedorov published a book, translated into German: “Das illegale Gebietskomitee arbeitet” (The illegal territorial committee at work) (pp. 181-82). That book has also fallen into the black hole.

In another radio address of May 1, 1942, Stalin told his listeners that the partisans have become more brutal, more merciless (p. 183). A competition was initiated between partisan units; each partisan had to kill at least five fascists and has to take part in at least three actions per month (p.184). Ponomarenko described – in a book by the English authors Dixon and Heilbrunn “Communist Guerilla Warfare” – the ‘dress code’ of partisans: Whoever observed the Bogdan group could not know what to make of it. More than half of them were dressed in German uniforms, some wear civilian cloth manufactured in Rovno or Lutsk, others Slovakian and Polish uniforms. In the supply wagon clothing’s for all sorts of partisan activities are carried along: SS uniforms, Italian uniform pants, etc. Ponomarenko admits here that his partisans were bandits, dressed in German and other uniforms and thus not protected by any convention (p. 185).

Now to the ‘liberation’ by the Red Army. In the third edition of “Geschichte der Kommunistischen Partei der Sowjetunion” (History of the communist party in the SU), published in 1970 (1971 in German), we read:

“Die Rote Armee zog als Befreier nach dem Westen. Dem Sowjetvolk, das für seine Freiheit und Unabhängigkeit kämpfte, konnten die Schicksale der anderen Völker, die unter dem Joch des Faschismus schmachteten, nicht gleichgültig sein. Den Ideen des proletarischen Internationalismus treu, ver­wies die Partei während des ganzen Krieges immer wieder auf die historische Befreiermission der sowjetischen Soldaten. Von diesem hohen Ziel beflügelt, brachte die Rote Armee den Völkern Europas die Befreiung von der faschisti­schen Sklaverei… Über den versklavten Völkern Europas leuchtet die Morgenröte der Befreiung auf.” . (Seite 623)

(The Red Army moved westward as a liberator. The people of the SU, who fought for their freedom and independence, could not be indifferent about the fate of others who still suffered under the Fascist joke. True to the ideals of proletarian Internationalism, the party always pointed out the mission of liberation to the Russian soldier. Carried by that lofty idealism, the Red Army liberated the people of Europe from Fascist slavery…The dawn of liberation has broken over the people of Europe; p. 189).

Reading this I am reminded of my time in the GDR. The same slogans were used year in year out, while reality differed substantially. The Czechs experienced the liberation in October 1944. The country received a communist regime, Benes, who had returned from exile, was forced to resign in June 1948. On March 9, 1948, foreign minister Masaryk ‘fell’ out of a window, a protest march of 10,000 Prague students was greeted with gunfire (p.191).

Ukraine did not fare any better. According to a report compiled by the Kersten- Committee, published in Germany in 1962, the regime of terror started with the arrival of the Bolsheviks in Kiev. Anyone appearing suspicious was murdered; mass murder became the norm. When the Germans arrived in 1941 they found 6,000 mutilated bodies in the basement of the Lvov prison, and that is just one example (pp. 191-92).

Now to the Baltic’s: here also, when the Soviets first occupied the countries, the terror began. In 1941 – 10,000 Estonian men, woman and children were deported to Siberia, 34,000 from Latvia, among them 1,877 school children and 1,188 children under six years old, 34,260 from Lithuania. All of it as ordered by the butcher Serov. What was started then was completed in 1944 following the ‘liberation’: From 1945 to 1949, about 150,000 Estonians were taken to the SU, as well as 290,000 Latvians. The number of Lithuanians taken is not known. Those suspected of collaboration with Germans were executed (p. 194).

Poland also did not do so well during the liberation. As long as the Polish resistance fought along side the Red Army they were tolerated, but when the fighting stopped the officers were separated from the men and shot or taken to camps. Between July 1944 and 1945, 50,000 Polish resistance fighters were arrested, 20 commanders executed because of their expressed loyalty to the government in exile in London. Show trials were conducted and death sentences handed out. 40,000-resistance fighters were sent to Siberia, according to Mikolayczyk, head of the government in exile (p. 196).

Romania: Of the 3,331 priests and clergyman still around in 1945, by 1953 — 1,462 had been killed, 250 were missing, and 400-500 were jailed. 40 concentration camps still existed in 1955; in 1954 about 230,000 Romanian POWs were still held in Russian work camps, and 100,000 ethnic Germans were deported by the Red Army. Between 1940 and 1941 and after 1945, some 850,000 Rumanians from Bessarabia and Bukovina (Germans?) were taken to the SU. 30,000 men and woman were forced to help build the Black Sea-Danube Canal, among them priests, professors, farmers, workers and students. The Russian guards took women to be interrogated; they later returned beaten up and many of them had been raped. Those who became pregnant often died. When the camps were closed, the inmates were loaded into cattle cars and driven around for weeks, aimlessly. The majority died, because no real food was provided and no water (pp. 198-99). This was taken from testimony given before a UN commission; the US had sent Mark F. Ethridge to investigate. But here, too, one wonders if the part about transports in cattle cars without water was not later adopted by Jews.

Many more details provided, too many to list here, but nothing of it mentioned at the IMT, Russians acting as judges and prosecutors, the Red Army portrayed as liberators – as the most humane army in the world. And Germans are blamed for anyone missing, no doubt in those cases as well. East Germans were of course also hit hard by the liberation. Not just in the eastern part of Germany proper but also while trying to flee their ancestral homes in East Prussia, Silesia, etc., with Russian tanks plowing through refugee convoys consisting of women, children and old people for the most part. Hubertus Knabe wrote about it, in “Tag der Befreiung?” (Day of Liberation?, Propyläen Verlag, Berlin 2005), but that book will have to be discussed another time.

Russian officers told their troops that they are allowed to plunder and rape with impunity, and that they did. Official historiography wants us to believe that the conquest of Silesia and finally Berlin was delayed by two to three month because of stiff German resistance. Not so. It was the propaganda – and orders – hammered into the Russian soldiers that, when they entered Germany, they had now stepped into the “cave of the Fascist animal” (Höhle des faschistischen Tieres), and should take revenge however they please. The logical consequence was that the troops refused to follow orders, quasi deserting. Following the war Marshals Shukov and Chuikov openly debated if the war could not have ended three month sooner. Der Spiegel, a German magazine, wrote about it on July 14, 1965:

„Eine historische Sicht des ,Wunders an der Oder’, die von den Erinnerun­gen der beiden Marschälle erheblich abweicht, gab einer ihrer damaligen Untergebenen: Exhauptmann Boris Olschanski, der jetzt in Argentinien lebt. In seinem Buch ,Wir kommen vom Osten’ nennt der ehemalige Mathe­matikdozent die Gründe, die seiner Ansicht nach für den Abbruch der russischen Berlin-Offensive im Februar 1945 maßgebend waren: Auf der Jagd nach Frauen, Beute und Schnaps hätten sich ganze Teile der Roten Armee in den ostdeutschen Weiten verflüchtigt. Vergebens hätten die höheren Stäbe versucht, die plündernde, mordende und sengende Truppe wieder in die Gewalt zu bekommen. Fluchend habe sich der Chef der 5. Stoß­armee, Generalleutnant Bersarin (später der erste Stadtkommandant von Berlin) auf den Weg gemacht, um mit vorgehaltener Pistole die Befolgung seiner Befehle zu erzwingen. Doch auch Bersarin resignierte: ,Man kann nicht zwei Hasen auf einmal fangen: rächen und kämpfen. Die Armee hat sich aufgelöst, hol’s der Teufel!’”

(A former subordinate of the two Marshals, Captain Boris Olshanski who now lives in Argentine, provided an account of the ‘miracle on the Oder’ which differs from that of the two Marshals. In his book “We are arriving from the east” the former professor of mathematics gives his view of the reasons for the abandonment of the Berlin offensive in February 1945: In their hunt for woman, loot and booze whole segments of the Red Army vanished into the vast expanses of eastern Germany. The commanders tried in vain to regain control over the plundering, murdering and scorching troops. Lieutenant General Bersarin, swearing and with his gun pointing tried to have his orders adhered to. But he also resigned: ‘Impossible to catch two rabbits at the same time: revenge and fighting. The army has disintegrated, to hell with it!’; pp. 206-07).

I experienced some of it, our home only about 50km from the Oder/Neiße. And although by then Russian officers had regained some control, raping and pillaging still went on for days. On the other hand, German soldiers were severely punished if caught looting; some were shot (p. 207). Even the burning down of villages — which housed partisans and the villagers supporting them — was prohibited (p. 188).

It was not only the likes of the Jew Ilja Ehrenburg who urged Russian soldiers to kill Germans at will. In the Soviet Union no actions by individuals were tolerated, one can thus be certain that this incitement for hatred, the call to murder, was officially sanctioned. The so-called Kommissars played a large role in it, spreading communist ideology, i.e., hatred for Germans. They also positioned themselves behind the lines and ‘urged’ their soldiers on, discouraging any attempt to surrender with machine gun volleys into the formations of their own soldiers (Victor Suvorov, Marschall Schukow. Lebensweg über Leichen, Pour le Mérite, Verlag für Militärgeschichte, Selent, 2002, p. 262f). Hitler was aware of the commissars and issued the so-called ‘Commissar Order’, that order was also largely ignored by German officers, and thus ineffective, to the detriment of German POWs.

The actions by commissars not only resulted in spreading hatred of anything German but also made for a desperate type of warfare on the part of Russian soldiers. Afraid to move back, even in hopeless situations, out of fear of getting shot by the NKVD troops stationed behind the lines and commanded by commissars, they moved forward, resulting in what can only be called massacres. Suvorov describes this in the book mentioned above, but former German soldiers have also told me this. One of them, a former officer, told me that some of his soldiers became violently ill, vomiting, but had to continue firing into the onrushing Russian soldiers, who were often drunk, surrender would have been suicide. I fully understand that I am repeating hearsay, but these people had no reason to lie and Suvorov confirms what they told me.

Right at the start of the war, German soldiers who had been ambushed were found with their eyes gorged out and mutilated in the most horrendous fashion. One was found with his arms tied backward around a tree, his hands nailed to it, his eyes gorged out and his tongue cut out, some of them had their genital cut off (pp. 208-09). During the fight near Selisharova in November 1941 a field hospital with 30 to 40 wounded fell into the hands of the Russians. When the Germans recaptured the area they found only charred remains. The Russians had piled the wounded into a stack, poured gasoline over them and burned them. Woman also participated in the atrocities, slitting the wounded open. Here also pages upon pages of this and that the reason the Soviets are trying to prevent this from being published (pp. 208-13).

The numbers of those killed, unless found by Germans, will never be known, even if Russian archives should be opened, for the Russians did not keep records (p.176). The same goes for those German soldiers who died in captivity. Estimates of those captured range from 3.2 to 3.5 million, with about 1.1 million of them dying while held prisoner.

As for the treatment of POWs we have a repeat of what happened to them in Yugoslav captivity. It also started with Todesmärsche und Todestransporte (death marches and transports), the caption of a chapter (pp.219ff). The intent of the marches was to impress the population, German POWs displayed as trophies. It started with Stalingrad, bodies of German POWs covered with snow lining the marching routes. The temporary camp Beketova held 50,000 to 60,000 prisoners, 42,000 of them died of hunger and diseases. And as was the norm, German POWs were stripped clean, anything of any value, perceived or real, taken from them. During drunken parties Russian soldiers adorned themselves with the rings, watches and medals they had stolen (p. 220). About one quarter of the marchers died, either just collapsed or were shot as stragglers or while trying to reach drinking water.

Those transported by train did not fare better, the numbers of dead as high as those from the marches (p. 224). Of the about two million Germans taken prisoner outside the territorial SU, 250,000 died before they reached POW camps (p. 225). One of the harassments consisted of feeding the transported with salted herrings, but not supplying any drinking water.

Life in the camps was not better, with the Soviets making an effort to curtail the activities of the IRC; East-Berlin RC officials were taken to the SU and interned (p. 229). Bugs, fleas and rats were steady companions. In one of the camps with 5,000 inmates the toilet consisted of 4 holes dug into the ground, 15 small bowls for washing, and the death rate about one per hour (p. 234). And here also, the list goes on and on.

As in the Yugoslav camps, in Soviet camps German communists also formed Antifa (anti fascist) committees, supposedly organized to look after the welfare of the POWs. But they were traitors of the worst kind, setting work norms so high that many of the POWs died trying to fulfill them. They also participated in torture, pointing out victims to the officials. Those ‘confessions’ were later also used to convict in the show trials (pp. 237-245). Efforts were made by Antifa members to plant distrust between officers and men, successful to some extend, for rewards were offered (pp. 246-252).

Hunger was also a steady companion, making willing participants out of some to just have the ration increased if only for a day. To understand the actions of those a Russian proverb is offered: Someone with a full stomach will never understand the hungry. And they did not just go hungry for a few weeks, but for years (p. 253). The German commission formed to investigate the plight of POWs concerned themselves with rations, the details filling one of the 15, as of now unpublished, volumes. An average daily rations consisted of 400-600 grams bread, vegetables only in soups with traces of meat in them but mostly just water with clover or some corn in it. The consequence was dystrophy and diarrhea, with death the final solution in most cases. Packages send from home were opened, but still at times they were virtual life savers (p. 254). A few details: 60% of the bread consisted of water which was dispersed at 1:00 in the morning; the ‘bread’ was served hot in an almost liquid form, but the hunger forced it down (p. 256). Frozen potatoes were used and when spring arrived, the stench emanating from them was overpowering, causing many to vomit; unable to eat the ‘soup’. Regardless, the full, required, calorie count was recorded every day (p. 257).

And it must not be forgotten that the POWs were forced to work under those conditions, hard work in many cases, mining or work in the forest, with death bringing in a rich harvest. “Those who died did so in spite of all the efforts by Russian doctors”, or so “Sowjetunion heute” has it. True, some doctors tried but it was the inhuman communist system that was not interested in their survival. And all efforts made to reach an understanding must address this also (pp. 333-34).

Reading this is not easy for me, having experienced some of the effects of ‘liberation’ by the Red Army. Also, following the war, those soldiers lucky enough to have survived the Soviet POW camps talked openly about it; I heard many a horror story. But that side of it has now disappeared. German soldiers are now portrayed as criminals, with the other side fighting the ‘good war’. And historians participate in this distortion, willingly. One can only hope that there is a higher justice.

To be continued…

In the Fight with the Partisans:

This is the caption of the first chapter under “Yugoslavia” – getting back to Crimes of the Victors, the book under discussion. It contains four chapters in total, Yugoslavia, Soviet Union, Poland and Czechoslovakia.

Instead of writing “the authors tell us”, or “we are told”, I’ll just translate what is written, not verbatim unless noted, with the page numbers added and add my comments if necessary.

Russian defense minister Marshal Andrei Grechko, during the 1975 preparation of the victory celebrations regarding the 30^th anniversary of Germany’s defeat, stated in the Czech press that it was not just the Soviet army that defeated Germany, but that the resistance groups of east and south Europe played a decisive part. The Yugoslavs protested, for Grechko placed the efforts of the Romanians and Bulgarian’s on the same level as those of the Yugoslavs. Marshall Josip Broz Tito, in a speech, talked of distortion of history (p.25). 1.7 million Yugoslav lives were lost in their fight for freedom; there could never be mention of a “joint victory over Fascism”. When reminded that the Red Army supplied the Yugoslav resistance fighters with weapons and logistics, Tito replied that all they lacked were tanks. The Russian historian Wladimir Selenin, in a TASS interview, praised the efforts of the Yugoslav partisans who tied up large continence of German troops, making it possible for Red Army troops to be successful elsewhere. Thus helping to defeat the Germans, as well as the Italians and making the landing of the Anglo-American troops in Italy possible. This was still not enough to satisfy Tito (p.26).

As an aside, concerning the defeat of the Italians, here is what A. Fredborg had to say about some of them:

“The Rumanians run like rabbits, and the Italians are little better,” a German officer told me. He added that German troops had been brought up to the Middle Don and replaced the yielding Italians and Rumanians…One of the most important prerequisites for the partisan activities in Croatia-and in Serbia and Montenegro too,…was the double game to which the Italians committed themselves. Why they did so, is not quite clear. Part of the explanation is probably that they quite simply wanted to buy themselves peace. However that may be, the partisans got arms, ammunition, and food from them.” (Behind the Steel Wall, p. 152; 158/59)

Hitler should have been more careful when picking allies, for, with friends like these… Now back to whose partisans get the credit for defeating the Germans. On a visit to Moscow by Yugoslav President Bijedic on April 9, 1975 – during a toast – Bijedic never mentioned the role the Red Army played in Yugoslavia, but told the audience that:

“Die Völker und Nationalitäten Jugoslawiens, die von der Kommunistischen Partei und vom Genossen Tito geführt werden, begannen mit den Vorbereitungen zum organisierten Kampf vom ersten Tage des Überfalls Hitlers auf Jugoslawien und der Kapitulation des monarchistischen Regimes im April, 1941 an. Nach Hitlers Überfall auf die Sowjetunion veröffentlichte die KP Jugoslawiens eine Proklamation, in der sie zum bewaffneten Kampf gegen die Hitlerbanden und für die Befreiung des Landes von den Eindringlingen aufrief, zu einem Kampf, der sich über ganz Jugoslawien ausbreitete“. (pp. 26/27)

(The people and nationalities of Yugoslavia, led by the communist party, made preparations for an organized fight on the first day of Hitler’s attack, after the capitulation of the monarchist regime in April 1941. After Hitler’s attack of the SU, the communist party of Yugoslavia published a proclamation calling for armed resistance against the Hitler gangs and to liberate the country. This fight eventually spread over all of Yugoslavia.)

Here again evidence that partisan warfare had been planned well in advance of Barbarossa. Tito confirmed this in Skopje: even before the outbreak of WWII preparations for resistance were made. At that time 80,000 soldiers served in the partisan units, 300,000 in 1942. When in September 1943 Italy capitulated, Tito was made president of the National Committee, acting as the Yugoslav government, illegally because Yugoslavia was occupied. After a visit by a Soviet military commission in February 1944, the “Liberation Army” was increased to 50 divisions of 130 independent partisan units consisting of 500,000 illegal combatants. In early 1945 the “Liberation” army was renamed “Yugoslavian Army”, equipped with the most modern weaponry and now numbering 800,000. The numbers are based on Yugoslav sources. But, even though in early 1945 a regular Yugoslav army existed, actions between partisans and regular troops were impossible to distinguish, forcing Germans to act. (pp. 27/28). And even though partisan units were then organized, they did not wear the same uniforms, no official symbols visible from a distance and did not carry their weapons in the open (p. 56). It was thus still impossible for the Germans to separate regular forces from the irregulars, but the Yugoslavs never made mention of this in their court verdicts against German POWs.

Hitler never intended to send troops into Yugoslavia – this whole action in fact endangered Barbarossa – but was forced to when Mussolini’s ill fated Greek adventure became bogged down The Germans fearing a British bridge head in the Balkans, had to act. But the Balkans were and are a witches’ brew of warring nationalities. Dr. Hans Laternser tried to make this clear at the IMT, pointing out that in the Balkans different norms apply, the fight between nationalities are conducted with a brutality unknown to the people of western Europe (p. 29). Dr. Rudolf Ibbeken testified at the IMT that in the Balkans it was not just a conflict between the population and the occupying forces:

“…sondern daß innerhalb des einen Krieges, möchte ich sagen, noch eine Unzahl von gleichzeitigen Kriegen im Lande stattgefunden hat”. (p. 30)

(…but I would like to say that inside of this war a number of wars were fought simultaneously.)

Another historian, Dr. Georg Scheller, pointed out that the brutality with which the war in Yugoslavia was fought was not peculiar to WW II, rather it was

“in keiner Weise ihre Ursache etwa in einem besonders scharfen Vorgehen der deutschen Wehrmacht. In allen großen und kleinen kriegerischen Auseinandersetzungen auf dem Balkan sind Grundsätze und Regeln, wie sie etwa in der Genfer Konvention verankert sind, nie zur Anwendung gekommen… Es ist mithin nicht richtig, die besondere Schärfe der Kriegführung auf dem Balkan der deutschen Wehrmacht zuzuschreiben. Sie ist vielmehr geschichtlich als eine besondere Erscheinung aller Balkankriege zu erklären und zu werten“. (Ibid.)

(…in no way the result of the drastic measures by the German forces. In all the big and small Balkan wars the rules, as those set down in Geneva, were ignored…It is thus wrong to claim that Germans are to blame for the rigorous warfare. Rather, it is historically a special occurrence of all the Balkan wars, and must be evaluated as such.)

In September 1941 Germans found the “Anweisung der Kommunistischen Partei Serbiens für den Bandenkrieg” (Instructions by the communist party of Serbia for bandit warfare) in Belgrade, those instructions were submitted at the IMT, too long to reproduce in its entirety, here then just a few details:

“Partisan warfare:

Communications behind the front are of value, rail lines, telephone lines and bridges must be destroyed…

Precise reports about enemy movements are vital

If the population is supportive, the area behind the front can be controlled, forcing the enemy to employ more troops.

Raids: It is of utmost importance to approach the enemy unseen…

Close combat: The knife is the most important weapon…” (pp. 30-33)

All of those instructions – and there are many more – to fight illegally, clandestinely. A raid is successful when “der Gegner bis zum letzten Mann vernichted (ist)”(when the enemy is destroyed to the last man). Tito ordered Serbian partisans

“…jegliche Kennzeichen abzulegen, die Waffen zu verbergen und erbeutete deutsche Uniformen anzuziehen. Im Jastrebac-Gebirge traten 80 Prozent der Partisanen in deutscher, der Rest in bulgarischer Uniform auf. Von hier wie aus dem Raum der serbisch-bulgarischen Grenze wurden Funksprüche abgefangen, in denen die Liquidierung deutscher Soldaten stets unter der Bezeichnung ‘abgeschlachtet’ gemeldet wurde“. (p. 37)

(…to take of all identification badges, to hide the weapons and dress in German uniforms. In the Jastrebac Mountains 80% of the partisans wore German, the rest Bulgarian uniforms. Radio messages were intercepted recording the killing of German soldiers as ‘butchered’.)

Again and again bodies of German soldiers were found with their eyes popped out, genitals cut off, heads split, and naked – almost impossible to identify (p. 40). The Red Cross emblem was no guarantee for safety, Persons wearing the Red Cross, buildings, trucks and trains marked with it were even singled out as targets, forcing the authorities to decrease the size of the emblem (p. 41). The armed forces compiled a whole collection of photos and reports of atrocities and handed them to representatives of the IRC (International Red Cross; p. 44).

All of this was ignored at the IMT. On August 21, 1946 defense attorney Dr. Laternser presented evidence of the partisan tactics, pointing out that those illegal acts were the reason for German reprisals and that it was not the Germans who engaged in illicit warfare. He stated:

“Affidavits 906 to 931 give examples of the fighting methods of the partisans, while Affidavits 906 to 920 describe particularly dreadful atrocities committed by partisan bands. Affidavits 921 to 924 prove the partisans’ actions in violation of international law, with regard to clothing, weapons, and other details. Affidavits 925 to 931 describe the extent of sabotage against railroads. That in spite of this the Germans fought according to the rules of international law, is proved by Affidavits 932 to 970. They show that the partisans were treated like prisoners of war.” (p. 393)

http://avalon.law.yale.edu/imt/08-21-46.asp

As mentioned, all of this was disregarded. The judges maintained that Germany fought an illegal war, a “War of Aggression”. (p. 53) But as has been shown in part III, officers and soldiers can not be expected to differentiate between an illegal war and a legal war. Further, “Control Council Law No.10”, concocted in London following WWII, was law written after the fact, ex post facto, violating one of the fundamentals of jurisprudence. What it states under: “a) Crimes against Peace. Initiation of invasions of other countries and wars of aggression in violation of international laws and treaties…” is therefore of no consequence, for international law – agreements between states – never prohibited war. The Kellogg-Briand Pact on which this was based only states:

“Convinced that all changes in their relations with one another should be sought only by pacific means and be the result of a peaceful and orderly process, and that any signatory Power which shall hereafter seek to promote its national interests by resort to war a should be denied the benefits furnished by this Treaty;”

http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/imt/kbpact.htm

There is nothing here about illegal wars and punishment of individuals. All it says is that if a state should go to war it will lose the benefits furnished by this Treaty. Thus German soldiers had every right to counteract the illegal partisan warfare.

More details about atrocities committed on German soldiers are provided, killing of those who had surrendered. Also more mention of the fighting between the Croatian Ustasha and the Serbian Cetnici, their atrocities blamed on the Germans (pp. 48-51; 63). A report states that when the ice started to melt on the rivers, masses of bodies could be seen floating down the Sava and Danube rivers. On some days the Germans fished out up to 30 bodies (p. 65). These were victims of the infighting between rival Yugoslav factions, but all of them no doubt part of the 1.7 million allegedly killed by the Germans. It is the duty of the occupying army to restore order (p. 59), but not only did the Germans have to fight partisans, intend on inflicting losses on them, they were caught between warring groups, compounding the problems.

When Yugoslav forces captured Belgrade, many of them illegal combatants, supported by Red Army units, up to 30,000 German POWs were shot. Hundreds of German female radio operators, Blitzmädel, and Red Cross nurses were killed by placing them on pointed posts; others were used for target practice (p. 70). 10,000 murdered German soldiers were buried in a mass grave near the Kalemagdan fortification. A Red Cross nurse testified that during the Belgrade fighting, all of the wounded in an ambulance train were killed with knifes. Most of the places were those atrocities occurred are known, yet no effort by an international body has been made to locate the graves (p. 70).

On May 6, 1945, General Kesselring told the commander of the southeast army, colonel general Löhr, that Germany would capitulate on May 9. Löhr then contacted Tito to work out the capitulation details. Anything agreed upon was totally ignored by the Yugoslavs as soon as the Germans had surrendered and disarmed. Some 150,000 German soldiers ended up as Yugoslav POWs immediately, something German officers tried to prevent, cognizant of the hatred felt. The number of those butchered is not known (p.75). How many German soldiers in total were taken POWs is impossible to ascertain, because of unknown number of those murdered. Official figures talk of 200,000 to 240,000. But, army group Löhr was at that time 400,000 strong. According to official figures, 80,000 perished between 1944 and 1949 (p. 78)

The POWs were moved to camps in so-called Sühnemärsche, atonement marches. The Geneva Convention states that POWs can march no more than 20km (12.5 miles) a day. One of the POWs groups was forced to march 75km in 20 hours (p. 85). Whoever strayed was shot. Food was scares, anyone begging for water or food was also shot. 10,000 perished during those marches (p. 92).

Camp life was no better. Hardly any food was provided and prisoners were forced to gather herbs and cook them, the result was diarrhea and dysentery. “Death worked with a scythe”, in Belgrade camp # 1 the dysentery barrack housed 800; it was called the death barrack with at least 10 corpses carried out each day (p. 93). Inmates were also worked to death, in lumber camps and mines. They were also forced to clear minefields, but were not supplied with the proper equipment. At times, at the end of a shift hundreds of POWs were chased onto the cleared field, to insure that no mines were left (p. 94). Those who died were buried in unmarked graves, their names never recorded.

The partisans stilled their thirst for revenge first on members of the Waffen-SS. According to a report, on Pentecost Sunday 450 soldiers were shot near Reichenburg, their arms tied together with telegraph wire in groups of six, all shot in the back. At the capture of Krusevac, 2,000 soldiers of the “Prinz Eugen” division were murdered. In Reichenegg the partisans forced POWs into a bunker and dynamited it. When the stench became too strong, survivors had to cover the bunker with dirt. At Susegrad, partisans undressed 90 soldiers and chased them into the Sava River. Whenever possible the inmates buried the dead and marked the graves with stones or wooden crosses. In 1948, after the last POWs had left the provisory camps, locals dispersed the stones, gathered the crosses and burned them (p. 96).

Reading this, one has to wonder if the Soviet prosecutors at the IMT used those real atrocities, as committed on Germans, to spread tales about German atrocities. Jews also seem to have copied some of this to ‘enrich’ their stories.

The “Antifaschistische Ausschüsse” (antifascist committee), short Antifa, played a sordid role in all of this. Founded by the communist Karl Wolch to represent the POWs, he, along with the co-founder Adolf Ische, soon showed their true colors. He blamed the fate of the POWs on the ‘breathtaking crimes committed by the Nazis’ and claimed that most POWs had realized this, many thousands remaining in Yugoslavia to assist in the rebuilding of the country (pp. 97/8). He further stated that whoever had seen a German concentration camp would well be able to appreciate the positive differences, conveniently forgetting the tens of thousands who perished during the ‘atonement marches’ and in the camps (p. 99). Some of those discharged had to sign an affidavit, promising to work for the unification of the workers at home (GDR), etc. Refusing to sign would have meant remaining in the camp. The Antifa helped to set work norms, many perished because of them (pp.100 to 104). They also assisted in torture, thus helping to extort ‘confessions’ from officers and soldiers, later used in trials.

Many more examples are provided, too many to list here. We now get to the Trials. Just as the Soviets before them – when they established the “Extraordinary State Commission for Ascertaining and Investigating Crimes Perpetrated by the German-Fascist Invaders and their Accomplices” in November 1942 – the Yugoslavs also established the “State Commission for Ascertaining War Crimes of the Occupying Forces and their Helpers” (Staatliche Kommission zur Feststellung von Kriegsverbrechen der Besatzungsmächte und ihrer Gehilfen) before the war ended (p.118). 4433 Germans and 2062 Austrians were to be charged with committing war crimes (one needs to wonder what happened to the Italians?).

The Nuremberg verdict in Trial VII vs. the South-East Generals, the so-called hostage trial, aroused the ire of the prosecution, because it had determined that partisan activity was illegal.

From Wikipedia:

“The tribunal had to deal with two pressing questions:

Were partisans “lawful belligerents” and thus entitled the status of prisoners of war?

Was taking hostages and reprisals against civilians as a “defense” against guerrilla attacks lawful?

On the question of partisans, the tribunal concluded that under the then current laws of war (the Hague Convention No. IV from 1907), the partisan fighters in southeast Europe could not be considered lawful belligerents under Article 1 of said convention. On List, the tribunal stated:

“We are obliged to hold that such guerrillas were francs tireurs who, upon capture, could be subjected to the death penalty. Consequently, no criminal responsibility attaches to the defendant List because of the execution of captured partisans…”

Regarding hostage taking, the tribunal came to the conclusion that under certain circumstances, hostage taking and even reprisal killings might constitute an allowed line of action against guerilla attacks. In the tribunal’s opinion, taking hostages (and killing them in retaliation for guerilla attacks) was subject to several conditions.”

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hostages_Trial

When that verdict became known, all of the Yugoslav verdicts should have been reversed, they were not. The Belgrade prosecution did wait until the verdict of the main IMT trial was published, but not until the aforementioned trial had concluded. The farcical trials started on October 14, 1946, in the first case, 32 former members of the Waffen-SS were indicted, 21 shot, the rest send to forced labor prison terms between five and twenty years. There were 11 main trials in total, the last one commenced on October 22, 1947. 121 German/Austrian officers were charged, 96 of them murdered (2 shot, the rest hanged), the rest send to long prison terms, life most often. All in all about 3,000 German and Austrian officers were imprisoned, 1,000 returned, 1,000 died while in capture, 1,000 were executed (pp. 118-123).

The verdict of the South-East Generals trial in Nuremberg of July 8, 1947 to February 19, 1948, in which partisan warfare was declared to be illegal, came too late for the officers murdered by the Yugoslavs following their “trials”. The haste with which those sham proceedings were conducted has to be suspect; also, did the Nuremberg ‘judges’ wait until the Yugoslavs were finished murdering the innocent?

The final act of this drama started on January 18, 1949 in Werschetz, Vršac in Serbian. Here also the ethnic conflict, common to the Balkans, played a role, Werschetz is located in the Banat with a large German population. It is possible that this city was picked for the benefit of the few Germans that were left behind, but not the issue here. Many of the remaining German officers and soldiers were put on trial. Who selected them is not known (p. 135), but since the Yugoslav claimed that the “fascists” had murdered 1.7 million of their citizens, more show trials were needed to satisfy the populace. A returning German soldier, Pfeiffer, later testified at a Munich court that he knew for a fact that no evidence of any wrongdoing existed for 95% of those charged (p. 136). Quotas were established: Since so and so many Yugoslavs had been shot, and since a number of Germans have been charged, every German had to have shot his percentage of them (p. 137). ‘Confessions’ were extracted through torture. One of them, Dr. Martin Speer, refused to commit/confess to any crime. He was hanged by his hands from the ceiling and beaten until he died. The preferred method of torture was tying the hands of the victim behind his back and then hanging him on the hands. Or fastening of a small pail to the genitals, and then loading the pail with bricks. Beatings with anything handy were also common. According to an Austrian officer, Werschetz was a ‘war crimes factory’ (pp. 135-161).

Many, many more details are provided, 26 pages worth, too much to list here. And here too, most of the accused were sentenced to death. But, the political climate had changed and Tito needed the BRD. Thus, on June 30, 1950 the sentences were reduced to 18 or 20 year jail terms (pp. 164/65). An effort was made to turn some of those sentenced into communists, or to work in the Yugoslav security service, spy agency. But as relation with the BRD improved, some were let go, having to promise not to tell, the rest were ignored so as to not stir up hatred, as detailed in Part I.

And this is what the history of the Third Reich is based on. Sham trials conducted by the victors in which the accused were convicted based on ex post facto ‘laws’, and prevented from making their case by submitting exonerating evidence; or on ‘confessions’ beaten out of them. We also need to remember that most of what really had happened was recorded, but the records never published, no doubt destroyed by now.

Vae Victis, but we need to add that following WW II a concerted effort was/is made to demonize Germans.

To be continued…

Dr. Rudolf Aschenauer, a lawyer who was involved in the defense of German soldiers, in his book about partisans “Krieg ohne Grenzen” (War without borders, [Druffel-Verlag, Leoni am Starnberger See, 1982]), complains that the partisan issue was never properly addressed in all the trials he was involved in (p. 139). To make his case he submitted an affidavit to that effect to a court, a copy archived at the Institute für Zeitgeschichte IfZ (Institute for Contemporary History). I believe I found it, but was told by the Institute that they are unable to release a copy because persons involved are still alive. A copout, here is their standard, printed, reply:

“Einsicht darf nur für nachgewiesene wissenschaftliche Arbeiten und nur unter der Auflage gestattet werden daß bei einer Verwendung die Namen der beteiligten Personen im Zusammenhang mit den Unterlagen nicht mitgeteilt werden“.

(Access to the material is only permitted for scientific projects and only under the premise that names of persons involved will not be made public.)

What ‘persons involved’ would those be, and why would I publish their names? In any case, the affidavit seems to have disappeared. Before we go into detail about partisans, per Dr. Aschenauer, a little from the introduction of his book (p. 9). My translation is of the essential parts:

On May 24, 1956, during a conference hosted by the IfZ, Loius de Jong, a Dutch historian and journalist, in his address to the audience remarked that it is impossible to write a serious history of the partisan movement without access to the documents still buried in archives. For locked archives he mentions: “The American Office of Strategic Service, the British Political Warfare Executive and the Special Operations Executive.” Aschenauer writes that many more archives could be added, Russian archives especially.

Not much has changed since then: archives are still locked. Sorokina and a host of others complain about it.

As an aside, de Jong also talked about German trials and stated:

“In den deutschen Landen werden Prozesse mit dem Hintergrund der Jahre 1939-1945 geführt, ohne daß die Gerichte im Besitz ausreichender Unterlagen sind. Ohne Gesamtzusammenhänge zu überblicken, kann man sich kein sicheres Urteil erlauben“.

(In the German states trials are conducted based on the events of 1939-1945, and this even though the courts are not in possession of adequate documentation. But without the ability to put events in context it is not possible to be certain).

Defendants before German courts are still not allowed to present their case – to try and present anything in context is deemed by the judges an attempt to “minimize.” At the IMT, for instance, the defense was prevented from referring to the Versailles Treaty, the blueprint of WW II. Why not allow this? Because, and this has been mentioned before, the intent was and is to convict Germans.

Why are the documents on partisan activities still under lock and key? Dr. Aschenauer notes in the closing of his Introduction that the documents of Jewish institutions should also be made available: that without all of the documents we can only attempt to deal with the partisan subject. As for Jewish documentation, why are they not released? Jews did engage in partisan activities. Aschenauer devotes a chapter to “Juden im Widerstand” (Jews in the Resistance, pp.246-259), showing that whole Jewish partisan units existed.

About 500,000 Jews served in the Red Army: 25,000 to 30,000 as active partisans (Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn, Die Juden in der Sowjetunion, F.A. Herbig Verlagsbuchhandlung GmbH, München, 2003, pp.375/76). S. Schwarz also covers the Jewish partisan issue, quoting extensively from a book by Moshe Kaganovich, Der Idischer Ontayl in der Partizaner-Bevegung fun Sovet-Rusland (The Jewish role in the Soviet partisan movement, Central Historical Commission of the Partisan Federation PAKHAKH in Italy, Rome 1948; in: Soloman M. Schwarz, The Jews in the Soviet Union, Syracuse University Press, 1951, pp. 309 – 333). According to this, Jews even had their own Partisan Federation and bragged about their involvement after the war. All of it has disappeared, and only one copy of the Kaganovitch book available in Hebrew or Yiddish. Why? Because Jewish partisans just don’t fit into the newest version of “history,” in which Jews are depicted as innocent victims. Were Jews shot by the German armed forces and the EG? Of course, if they were caught participating in, or organizing, partisan activities, aiding and abetting them.

As regards organizing partisan warfare in the Soviet Union, we have this:

“To this (the attempts by the Germans to change the Russian railroads to European gauge. Wilf) were added the special Russian tactics and not least the activities of the partisans, who also worked in depth. Apart from experience in Yugoslavia (to be addressed in the next part. Wilf), the German forces had not, until then, come up against this kind of warfare. The Russians, on the other hand, had prepared it for years, had accumulated supplies of ammunition, arms, and food, installed radio stations, and trained their soldiers systematically in partisan tactics. When the regular army retreated the partisans immediately went to work. They laid mines and carried on espionage. They blew up bridges and seized transports. But they did not only wage ‘the little war’ with every modem expedient-the partisans were obviously operating on lines of high strategy. They concentrated on important centres and had their own bases in areas which they left in peace. They would let through quantities of ordinary trucks, but would suddenly strike when a car with high officers passed. And they shifted their activities from one district to another, according to the general strategic situation. They might keep quiet for weeks and then appear just before a German offensive or a Russian attack and try to inflict the greatest possible indirect damage on the German operations.” (A. Fredborg, Behind the Steel Wall, George G. Harrap & Co, In Association with B.U.E. Ltd., 1944, p.45, in Krieg ohne Grenzen, p. 129)

Arvid Fredborg, a Swedish journalist reporting for Svenska Dagbladet, was stationed in Berlin right up to May 31, 1943 informing us that: “A journalist in Berlin was no doubt in a better position than other foreigners to study war time conditions in Germany.” No doubt about it.

On p. 42 of the Fredborg book:

“In private, political circles (the officials in the Foreign Office and the Ministry of Propaganda) did not conceal their indignation that the Russians did not follow the rules of the game. Instead of giving in when encircled, they forced the Germans to continue the fight indefinitely. The Russians were fighting cunningly and against all international law, it was said. They were lacking chivalry and considered it their duty to kill the enemy regardless of when, where, and how. In addition to this they willfully scorched their own country. What this Russian mentality really signified would soon dawn on different quarters in Germany…”

It was this kind of warfare that Hitler warned his generals about, but their proud Prussian tradition prevented them from changing their tactics. They could not conceive of the possibility that the eastern campaign would not accord with the rules of war by the other side. The German high command was, however, aware of the training of partisans in the SU, as there were intelligence reports about partisan maneuvers taking place in the spring of 1941 (Krieg ohne Grenzen, p. 116). Also, partisan warfare was/is part of communist ideology, a weapon in their fight for world revolution and dominance (Ibid., p. 56).

The early partisan successes are evidence that preparations for illegal partisan warfare in the Soviet Union was made well in advance of June 22, 1941, the start of Barbarossa. Einsatzgruppen (EG), units of the Security Police in charge of maintaining order in the occupied territories were formed in September 1939, during the Polish campaign: further evidence that the EG were not special ‘Jew killing squads’ as claimed. And restoration of order in the occupied territories was not an option, as stated in the Convention (IV) respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land and its annex: Regulations concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land. The Hague, 18 October 1907:

SECTION III

MILITARY AUTHORITY OVER THE TERRITORY OF THE HOSTILE STATE

Art. 42. Territory is considered occupied when it is actually placed under the authority of the hostile army.

The occupation extends only to the territory where such authority has been established and can be exercised.

Art. 43. The authority of the legitimate power having in fact passed into the hands of the occupant, the latter shall take all the measures in his power to restore, and ensure, as far as possible, public order and safety, while respecting, unless absolutely prevented, the laws in force in the country.“(http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/full/195)

To restore “public order and safety” in an occupied territory is no easy task under any conditions, but nearly impossible when faced with a well organized resistance as was the case in Poland from September 1939 on, and later in the Soviet Union. In addition to the above Hague Rules, here is what “The United States Rules of Warfare” states, in part:

Ҥ 12. Uprisings in occupied territories.

If the people of a country or any portion thereof, already occupied by an army, rise against it, they are violators of the laws of war, and are not entitled to their protection.

§ 348. Hostilities committed by individuals not of armed forces.

Persons who take up arms and commit hostilities without having complied with the conditions prescribed by the laws of war for recognition as belligerents are, when captured by the injured party, liable to punishment as war criminals.”

And “The British Manual of Military Law” provides this;

Ҥ 19. Peaceful inhabitants, on the other hand, may not be killed or wounded, nor as a rule taken prisoner, if, however, they make an attempt to commit hostile acts they are not entitled to the right of armed forces and are liable to execution as war criminals. (August von Knieriem, The Nuremberg Trials, Henry Regnery Company, Chicago, Illinois 1959, pp. 360-61)

It is of note that some of those rules were suspended during the Nuremberg proceedings:

“At a time suspiciously close to the preparation of the Nuremberg prosecutions, the English and American provisions quoted above were changed so that they came to correspond to those of CCL No. 10, as enacted in 1945, according to which, acting on the basis of superior order, rather than eliminating criminal responsibility, is to constitute only an extenuating circumstance (Art. II 4b). One can hardly doubt that this change was made for the sole purpose of making it impossible for the defense to refer to that Anglo-American view which had failed to conform to CCL No. 10. The change would not, however, undo the fact that until 1944—i.e., exactly at the time when the Nuremberg acts were committed—a different view had prevailed in both systems…As soon as the prosecutions of war criminals were over, the change of the English War Manual was repealed.” (Ibid, pp. 248-49)

The Americans also restored their rules after the Germans were found guilty, fearing that the Chinese and North Koreans would refer to the Nuremberg rulings during the Korean War and charge American and British POWs with committing war crimes (Franz W. Seidler, Das Recht in Siegerhand, Pour le Mérite – Verlag für Militärgeschichte, Selent 2007, pp. 27-28)

Now to those early partisan successes. In Polish archives (ministry of the interior) the reports by the EG from September 6 to October 5, 1939 are stored, detailing the efforts made by the Polish resistance to inflict damage (Krieg ohne Grenzen, pp. 170-191). Aschenauer describes how well the resistance was organized and also the formation of partisan units at the beginning of the war with Russia (pp. 192-201). As mentioned before, he devotes a whole chapter to “Jews in the Resistance” (pp. 246-256).

German HQ was aware of the partisan problem before the Russian campaign of June 22, 1941, but grossly underestimated its extent. They did not realize how well they were organized as a part of the regular Soviet armed forces. From July to September 1941, 122 partisan units were formed in one area of the Ukraine alone, comprising about 5,800 persons, as well as 750 more working as agitators. In another area, 437 units were formed, consisting of 7,200 fighters. The Komsomol, Soviet youth organization, added 7,000 fighters (Ibid, p. 144). A report by the military police of June 22 – September 16, 1941 stated that 467 rail bridges were blown up and rail lines destroyed at 250 locations. (Ibid, p. 136). Losses were immense from the start—impossible to achieve without advanced training and the supply of essentials, like explosives. Aschenauer provides many more examples, as do other authors, confirming what Arvid Fredborg wrote about Russia’s official preparations for partisan warfare. This is addressed in more detail in the next part.

The legal aspects.

On November 12, 1940, Vyacheslav Molotov, Soviet foreign minister, arrived in Berlin at the invitation of Hitler. He brought with him a list of Stalin’s demands, all of which were impossible for Hitler to fulfill. Stalin had hoped that the minutes of this meeting were destroyed, but just in case he had a special unit, “Group Ulbricht,” search for them when the Red Army conquered Berlin. Their efforts were in vain: the minutes did finally surface, but have been largely ignored by “historians”. (Ernst Topitsch, Stalins Krieg, Verlag Busse + Seewald GmbH, Herford 1993, pp.139ff; Werner Maser, Der Wortbruch, Copyright 1994 by Verlag Olzog, München/Landsberg 2001, pp. 232ff).

Even if Hitler had decided to go along with Stalin’s demands, there would have been no guarantee that further claims would not follow. Also, Stalin had acted arbitrarily before (Der Wortbruch, p. 244). Hitler realized that Stalin never intended to keep his word, – the elimination of Poland played into Stalin’s hands: he now had a border with Germany and was able to amass troops there – but this is not the subject under discussion here. So on December 5 Hitler issued “Weisung Nr. 21 Fall Barbarossa” (Directive No. 21, Case Barbarossa). This was not a plan for attack, just a contingency plan, informing his generals that a war with the SU might be in the offing.

The situation deteriorated as Stalin moved more and more troops to the border (Walter Post, Unternehmen Barbarossa, Verlag E.S. Mittler & Sohn GmbH Hamburg, 1995, pp. 354ff), therefore plans for a preventive strike were made. Waiting for Stalin to attack was too risky. Hitler was well aware of what to expect in a war with the Soviet Union: that the Red Army would not fight by international rules. He had intelligence reports about the Russian civil war as well as the Spanish civil war (Walter Post, Die verleumdete Armee, Pour le Mérite Verlag für Militärgeschichte, Selent 1999, p. 52; 66). Hitler tried to loosen the reigns a little, allowing the troops to confront the illegal warfare planned by the Russians. On May 13, 1941 he therefore issued the “Partisan Warfare and Barbarossa Jurisdiction Order.”

Here’s a little about that order:

“The defendants in the High Command Case were accused of having treated as partisans lawful combatants and peaceful civilians. In this context the so-called Barbarossa Jurisdiction Order becomes relevant. The background of this order is the following: Barbarossa was a term of camouflage for the operations against the U.S.S.R.; in the course of the preparations for these operations, Keitel, Chief of the High Command of the Armed Forces, upon direct instructions by Adolf Hitler, issued, on May 13, 1941, an “Order on Exercising Military Jurisdiction in the Area of Barbarossa and on Special Measures by the Troops” (Nuremberg Trials, p. 362).

The words “Partisan Warfare” have since disappeared from the heading: it is now considered Hitler’s order for German troops to kill with impunity. In reality it was no such thing. Here is part of that order:

“Treatment of Crimes committed by Enemy Civilians.

1. Until further order the military courts and the courts martial will not be competent for crimes committed by enemy civilians.

2. Franc-tireurs will be liquidated ruthlessly by the troops in combat or while fleeing.

3. All other attacks by enemy civilians against the Armed Forces, its members and auxiliaries will be suppressed on the spot by the troops with the most rigorous methods until the assailants are annihilated.

4. Where no such measures were taken or, where they could not be taken, persons suspected will be brought before an officer at once. This officer will decide whether or not they are to be shot. Against localities from which troops have been attacked in a deceitful or treacherous manner, collective coercive measures will be applied
immediately upon the order of an officer of the rank of at least battalion commander, if the circumstances do not permit the quick identification of the individual perpetrators.

5. It is strictly forbidden to keep suspected persons in custody in order to put them at the disposal of the courts after the reinstatement of judicial jurisdiction over the indigenous population” (Ibid.)

Point 6 – omitted by von Knieriem for some reason – states that military courts can be reinstated if agreed upon by all commanders and if the area is sufficiently pacified (Verleumdete Wehrmacht, p. 53).

The German high command was not at all in favor of this order, fearing a breakdown of discipline. Therefore Commander in Chief of the army, Field Marshal von Brauchitsch, augmented this order with the so-called “Discipline Order” on May 24. Some details:

“While the Führer’s Order, in the interest of an effective conquest of the enemy and a speedy pacification of the country, intended to loosen military discipline, the Brauchitsch Order insisted on the ruthless and unconditional maintenance of army discipline. As far as criminal acts of Soviet civilians were concerned, the Brauchitsch Order could not restore the jurisdiction of the military courts abolished by the Führer’s Order; but an attempt was made to keep punishment through the field commanders within reasonable and fair limits by restricting the Führer’s Order to “serious cases,” while lighter offenses were supposed to be punished with temporary measures which were, for all practical purposes, a circumvention of the Führer’s Order.

There can be no doubt that von Brauchitsch tried to limit the Führer’s Order to a reasonable scope without trying to sabotage it entirely. His order must have been meant in this way, and in this sense it was also understood by the field commanders, who unanimously testified to that effect.” (Nuremberg Trials, p. 364)

There is no mention at all about permission to kill with impunity, quite to the contrary. As to number 4 in the above order, here are some general comments about problems encountered when trying to determine guilt or innocence:

“Furthermore, when guilt is not proved, the reason for acquittal usually lies in the fact that it cannot be proved in any way permissible under the law. The only basis for punishment would thus be the subjective belief of the judge. The situation is different, however, when the circumstances have almost completely convinced the judge that his suspicion is well-founded, but those persons who could tell the truth cannot be induced to speak. In such a case the judge may indeed be convinced of the guilt of the suspect, even in spite of some lingering doubts. Everyone who has ever rendered a judgment on the basis of circumstantial evidence or has witnessed such a judgment knows that such ultimate doubts may remain even after the passing of a legally unquestionable sentence. Considering the well-known fallaciousness of proof, the lacking or defective memory of witnesses and their liability to be influenced by rumors, hearsay, or even their own imagination, not to speak of intentional prevarication, who can ever feel absolutely sure that he really knew exactly the true course of events? All legal systems are therefore satisfied either to leave such questions to a jury, who need not give reasons for their verdict, or to require no more than that the judge be convinced “beyond reasonable doubt.”…” (Ibid., p. 368)

And this is in reference to peacetime conditions, which are totally different from what field commanders were faced with.

Von Knieriem continues:

“Certainly the German officers by whom executions were ordered were not always fully convinced or even without reasonable doubt. But they had to act in situations requiring speedy decisions and in which they could be sure that they would never obtain a better basis for their judgment. This consideration should by itself suffice to exclude the mechanical application of the rule of in dubio pro reo, which was intended for normal situations. Moreover, the acts in question were of a kind impossible of occurrence on such a scale in normal situations. Partisan activity was of tremendous scope. According to the testimony of the Chief of the General Staff of the Army, the interruptions of railway traffic caused by partisans amounted to 1,200 to 1,600 a day. To these were added raids on shelters, vehicles, and small units; acts of sabotage directed against cables, bridges, broadcasting stations, and air-fields; acts of violence against the peaceful population—all in all, several thousand war crimes per day.” (Ibid.)

This was about trying to get partisans, and by extension actions of illegal combatants, under control. Enormous damage was done daily: German soldiers were killed, desperately needed supplies were destroyed, and thus commanders were under pressure to stop these illegal activities. But, the measures taken were mostly ineffective. The statistics prove it. From Behind the Steel Wall, by Fredborg, pp. 153-54:

“Another drawback was that the Germans had not been able to curb the partisans. These were slowing down all the movements of the Wehrmacht, hampering their supplies, and so forth. From Leningrad to the Caucasus came the same story of the increasing numbers of partisans, of their growing impudence, and, last but not least, of how the partisan warfare was moving westward.

By this time the partisans were appearing on a large scale in the Ukraine, where they, in 1941, had not yet been operating in great numbers. In the Generalgouvernement they were slowly advancing westward, and even from Wartheland reports arrived indicating that the Poles there had indulged in partisan activities. In the Baltic States the Germans had to reckon with the partisans…

Even the smaller partisan groups were in communication by radio with the regular Russian troops. If their position threatened to become untenable Russian planes, summoned by radio, intervened in the fighting.

All reports were unanimous in pointing out that the German troops had not found a remedy against the partisans. In daytime they were Russian workers in German service, and by night they were soldiers. To try to separate the sheep from the goats was considered impracticable, especially as the goats were so numerous.

In addition to these unfavourable factors, the superior winter tactics of the Russians should be particularly stressed.”

A now a few stats concerning reprisals:

“How successful these measures were is indicated by the entries in an Atlas of Operations of the Army Group North. The entry dated November 9, 1941, states that up to that date, 1,767 partisans were killed fighting, 1,213 were summarily executed, and 5,667 persons were arrested as suspected partisans; of these, 648 were executed. The number of 5,019 suspects released from arrest shows that suspected persons were not at all simply shot, and it is probable that as to the remaining 648, the suspicion had been proved to be justified. The figure of 1,213 partisans summarily executed also shows how relatively insignificant the German countermeasures were in comparison with the scope of partisan activities mentioned above. The 1,213 partisans shot during a period of 120 days, conservatively estimated, means 10 executions a day. That means that, on the average, one partisan was shot approximately every third day in the area of each of the divisions of the Army Group North.” (Nuremberg Trials, p. 370)

As partisan activity increased, reprisal measures increased: more partisans meant more executions. This was never taken into consideration at the IMT: partisans were ignored and reprisal measures deemed illegal; soldiers and officers performing their duties were branded as criminals. An elusive definition of “international law” was used to convict, but this ought not to have been applied since those convicted could never have been aware of this “law.” No specific, written international law even exists, only agreements between states which are impossible for individuals to be aware of.

There is another issue here: A law is not only put in place to punish, but also to protect.

“Therefore, the result remains the same: International law is not in a position to protect individuals, wherever they may be, against a domestic law which is illegal from the point of view of international law. According to general legal principles, it therefore cannot expect the individuals to expose themselves to such a risk. For the individual, always and everywhere, national law precedes international law. He has to obey the national law even where it compels him to violate international law.”(Ibid., p. 47)

Only lex loci — the law of the land — applies. The tribunal of the I.G. Farben case (No. VI) makes this clear:

“We cannot say that a private citizen shall be placed in the position of being compelled to determine in the heat of war whether his government is right or wrong, or, if it starts right, when it turns wrong. We would not re-quire the citizen, at the risk of becoming a criminal under the rules of international justice, to decide that his country has become an aggressor and that he must lay aside his patriotism, the loyalty to his homeland, and the defense of his own fireside at the risk of being adjudged guilty of crimes…or of becoming a traitor to his country…if he makes an erroneous decision based upon facts of which he has but vague knowledge. To require this of him would be to assign to him a task of decision which the leading statesmen of the world and the learned men of international law have been unable to perform in their search for a precise definition of aggression.”(Ibid., p. 508; source: Engl. Rec. pp. 15706 f)

A surprising admission, but correct nevertheless. Therefore, for a person to commit an illegal act, he/she has to be aware that it is illegal—must be conscious of the fact that what he/she is about to do is illegal. A little more detail:

“For if international law only addresses itself to states and only regulates their mutual relations, it cannot contain genuine criminal law. According to the legal opinion of all civilized states, only individuals are criminally responsible; thus, there cannot be a criminal responsibility of states. But as international law does not address itself to individual human beings, it cannot prescribe their punishment. For an act can only be punished by a law, if the same law had forbidden the act. If, however, international law does not address itself to individuals, it cannot contain prohibitions for individuals; and if it does not contain prohibitions for individuals, it cannot contain provisions for their punishment.”(Ibid., p. 47)

One more issue that was never considered at the IMT: “only individuals are criminally responsible.” To punish individuals their guilt must be proven and it must be shown that they acted in violation of an existing law, a law they were obliged to uphold, thereby making them aware that they acted illegally.

As for “Consciousness of Doing Wrong” (Ibid, pp. 217ff):

“Fortunately, we can leave aside the so-called problems of the will, which are extremely complicated; as, for example, that of the so-called dolus eventualis (conditional intent). We can limit ourselves to the problem of determining what the actor had to know in order to be punishable. What knowledge means in this context is clear: The actor must have known the circumstances which render his act punishable…This so-called knowledge of the circumstances of the act is not irrelevant to our discussion, in the course of which we shall encounter cases in which the knowledge, or rather lack of knowledge, of certain circumstances should have been considered. Even more significant, however, is the question of whether or not the actor, in order to be charged with intent, must have known that his act was unlawful in the sense of its constituting a wrong. This problem is generally designated as that of the “consciousness of unlawfulness” or of doing wrong, and can be expressed in the following terms: Can the guilty intent be imputed to an actor who was not conscious of doing wrong? As the act must first be unlawful for the problem of the actor’s guilt to be raised at all, the question may also be expressed in the following way: Can anybody be punished for being guilty of intent if he was mistaken about the lawfulness of his act? This is why the problem of the consciousness of doing wrong is generally designated as that of error of law or, since unlawfulness means that the act is prohibited, as the “error of prohibition.” Irrespective of the manner in which the question is formulated, its meaning is always the same; it refers to the determination of the extent, if any, to which the actor was conscious of doing wrong.”(Ibid, pp. 218/19)

The author, von Knieriem, goes into detail about this issue, too much to address here. At the end of the chapter he sums it up as such:

“The actor is not punished, however, if he considered his act lawful and could reasonably consider it so under the circumstances…But from the welter of contradictory cases and opinions we have obtained at least a negative definition of the concept of guilty mind, which must be correct if the concept of guilty mind is to have any meaning at all: No criminal responsibility exists where the actor considered his act permitted and could reasonably do so under the circumstances.

For Nuremberg this would mean: If the German or any other continental legal System had been applied, it would have been necessary to prove for every defendant either that he was conscious of doing wrong or, under certain circumstances, that he was blameworthy for not having had such consciousness. It does not appear to be fully clear how far such proof would have been required if American law had been applied. But so much is sure: According to American law, too, sentence could not be passed on a defendant who proved that he was conscious of acting in accordance with the law and that he could reasonably have such consciousness under the circumstances. Practically speaking, the difference between the two legal Systems seems hardly significant. In continental law, too, the problem of consciousness of doing wrong is hardly ever relevant unless it is specifically raised. In the great majority of cases the problem is taken up neither by the court, nor by the defendant, the defense counsel, or the prosecutor. But even where it is brought up it usually turns out to be irrelevant, because as a matter of evidence, German law, too, proceeds from the conviction that for a normal person the consciousness of doing wrong can be assumed. Generally it is therefore incumbent upon the defense to prove that consciousness of doing wrong was lacking in the particular case, and success is unlikely unless there is presented some really good reasons for the defendant’s lack of that consciousness. In itself the difference thus has by no means the significance that one might be inclined to ascribe to it on the basis of the great difference of theoretical conceptions. In Nuremberg it would therefore not have made much of a difference which national law was applied. Even though one would have tried to do the impossible and apply international law, punishment would have been inadmissible where there was no guilty mind—i.e., where the actor was not conscious; of doing wrong…. It must be emphasized again that the problem of consciousness of doing wrong could only become relevant if the act in question was unlawful under the German law of the time. Not unless the act was unlawful in that sense could it be at all significant whether or not the actor believed that his act was justified by necessity of war or as retaliation or that it was permitted under the law of war in consequence of a change in international norms. Even if the opinion that German law is of ultimate significance were erroneously rejected and if some foreign law or even the nonexistent international criminal law were applied without regard to punishability under German law, it would be necessary to examine whether the actor considered his act permitted because he believed in some ground excluding unlawfulness. To the grounds of exclusion of consciousness of doing wrong we should add, however, the actor’s knowledge or reasonable belief that his act was justified under German law, because at the time the acts were committed none of the persons who were later accused could foresee that he would ever be judged by any other law.” (Ibid., pp. 230ff)

Nothing needs to be added. The partisans were real and their actions illegal; thus reprisals by Germans were legal. Condemning Germans for acting illegally and punishing them under a nonexistent law, while concurrently ignoring the partisans was a miscarriage of justice. But the Nuremberg proceedings were never about administering justice. They were conceived simply to punish Germans.

“Doctor August von Knieriem deserves special attention. For many years…General Counsel of Germany’s largest business enterprise, the Interessen-Gemeinschaft Farben Indistrie, Aktiengesellschaft, more generally known as I.G.Farben. Obviously none but a lawyer of outstanding attainment could could obtain a position of such prominence and responsibility. Exactly by virtue of this office, Doctor von Knieriem found himself in the less enviable position of being charged with war crimes. In one of those twelve trials which were conducted in Nuremberg before military tribunals…Doctor von Knieriem was accused of having participated in the planning, preparation and waging of wars of aggression…He was found innocent of all charges and acquitted. His book has grown out of this personal experience”. (From the Preface to the American Edition, by Max Rheinstein, p.ix [The Nuremberg Trials]).

To be continued…

Elie Wiesel questioned under oath in a California courtroom in 2008:

Q. And is this book Night that you wrote a true account of your experience during World War II?

A. It is a true account. Every word in it is true.

In Part One, I established that the decision to rebrand Night into an autobiography was the reason for a new translation, in which necessary changes could be made to better ‘fit’ the story both to the real Elie Wiesel and the known facts of the Hungarian deportation.

When the 2006 translation came out, with its new classification to “autobiography,” questions arose from some circles. Responding to these questions, Edward Wyatt wrote an article in the NewYork Times on Jan. 19, 2006, in which he quoted Jeff Seroy, senior vice president at Farrar, Straus & Giroux, parent company of Night publisher Hill & Wang, as strongly denying that changes were made to bring the book more in line with the facts. “Nonsense,” said Seroy. “Some minor mistakes crept into the original translation that were expunged in the new translation. But the book stands as a record of fact.”

Left: Elie Wiesel manning his table at a Jewish book fair in Austin, TX in 2006. The new translation of Night by his wife Marion had come out in January of that year. It was also chosen for Oprah Winfrey’s book club at that time. Below: Publisher Jeff Seroy, center, with writer Brad Gooch to his left, Doug Stumps on his right .

Blaming the Translator

“Mistakes in the original translation” can only mean mistakes by Stella Rodway, the original translator! But we have already shown that Stella Rodway faithfully reproduced the French La Nuit, which was Wiesel’s own work. The author and publisher are casting these changes as translation errors to divert attention away from Elie Wiesel’s own errors—part of their campaign to pass Night off from now on as “a record of fact.”

A record of fact it isn’t

When I ended Part One, Eliezer and Father were still in the train car on their way to Buchenwald. You will recall that the Yiddish, the French and thus the original English version of Night specified the trip took 10 days and 10 nights from Gleiwitz (on the former German/Polish border) to Buchenwald. Since we know from standard historical sources1 that the prisoners were evacuated from Monowitz on Jan. 18 and arrived in Gleiwitz the next day, Jan. 19; and since according to the description in Night itself, they spend three days in Gleiwitz (Jan. 20-22), this would make their day of arrival February 1, 1945. But in Night, Father’s death takes place the night of Jan. 28-29, three days before they arrived! This is why Marion Wiesel removed the number 10 in her new translation, leaving the number of days and nights undetermined.

A strange detail that actually belongs in Part One is on page 87 of the original Night. Eliezer remarks, after his and his Father’s deliberations and final decision to go on the march: “I learned after the war the fate of those who had stayed behind in the hospital. They were quite simply liberated by the Russians two days after the evacuation.” The evacuation, as we all know, was on the 18th. We also know the Russians did not arrive on the 20th of January! The actual liberation day is January 27. What possessed Wiesel to write this? Well, because it was in Un di velt: “Two days after we had left Buna, the Red Army occupied the camp. All the sick had stayed alive.”

From the point in the story of Eliezer and Father’s arrival at Buchenwald there are no significant changes made by Marion Wiesel to the original French and English versions. But there is much in all the versions that differs strikingly from the “official holocaust history” as written by acknowledged official chroniclers such as Danuta Czech. So I will continue with comparisons between Night and “official history,” along with some very significant changes made from Un di velt hot geshvign to Wiesel’s edited French La Nuit.

Arrival at Buchenwald: 26 Jan. or 1 Feb.?

Danuta Czech, in her Auschwitz Chronicle1, records that on January 26,

A transport with 3,987 prisoners from Auschwitz auxiliary camps reaches Buchenwald. There are 52 dead prisoners in the transport. 115 prisoners die on the day of arrival. Their corpses are delivered to the autopsy room. (P 801)

This is the transport that carried Lazar and Abraham Wiesel/Viezel, Miklos (Nikolaus) Grüner and all of the inmates of Monowitz whose names are on the transport list.2 According to Czech, the Monowitz prisoners began their march on the evening of January 18, 1945, with “divisions of nurses placed between the columns” of 1000 each (P 786), arriving at Gleiwitz Camp the following evening. On Jan. 21 “they are loaded in open freight cars with other prisoners from Auschwitz who have arrived in Gleiwitz.” (P 788) From Jan. 21 to Jan. 26 is five days of travel … not ten, as Wiesel wrote in Night.

The narrative in Night gives us a date of Jan. 22 for the boarding of the train, one day later than Czech. And while Night gives the number of days on the train (10), it does not name the date of arrival.

Hilda Wiesel says her father died on arrival

Totally contradicting what is written in Night, Hilda Wiesel Kudler, Elie’s oldest sister, in her testimony for the Shoah Foundation in 1995, said she learned from her brother that their father died as he stepped off the train.

And I said, where is father? And he replied, he’s gone back to Sighet; he[Elie] didn’t want to tell me [that he was dead]. And I repeated, but where is he? And he insisted he was at Sighet. And I said, look, I want you to tell me the truth. Because he knew the date of my father’s death. You know, they did a long march3 from Auschwitz, then they put them on the train to go to Buchenwald; he died gasping for air; when he stepped off the train, he died gasping for air; at Buchenwald. But he[Elie] knew the date.

Right: Hilda Wiesel Kudler, in France, giving her videotaped testimony to the Shoah Foundation

From this, we can better understand something about Elie Wiesel—that he has never had a problem with making up stories that “sound better” than the truth. But, if Hilda is correct in her recall, and if their father really was one of the 115 inmates who Danuta Czech reports died on the day of arrival, then Wiesel’s long, melodramatic story of watching his father sicken and die over a ten-day period in Night is fiction. All of it—including his father being whacked on the head by a cruel “officer” in the barracks.

The day of arrival for this transport is Jan. 26, but according to the timeline in Night, it arrives on Feb. 1. Either way, it doesn’t correspond to the date of Jan. 28 that Wiesel, for reasons unknown, selected as the date his fictional Father died.

You might also be interested to know that Hilda is named Deborah in Un di velt; the name Hilda is never used. It was Wiesel who changed it to Hilda in La Nuit.

Un di Velt says Father dies a week after arrival in Buchenwald, Night says 8-10 days … yet it is January 28 … or is it the 18th Day of Shevat?

Regular readers of this blog will know this already, but it bears repeating yet again: there is no Shlomo Wiesel in the official history or in the records who fits the profile of “Father” as described by Elie Wiesel in Night. There is an Abraham (sometimes shortened to Abram) Viezel who is recorded in several places—on a medical report at Auschwitz, on the transport to Buchenwald, and on a death certificate dated Feb. 2, 1945, seven (7) days after arrival. This Abraham was born Oct. 10, 1900, making him 44 years old when he died. Recall that Night gives Father’s age as 50 in 1944 (SR, P 40).

Wiesel’s description has the transport to Buchenwald arriving on Feb.1st. But that’s just the beginning. After arriving, this is the timeline given in both the original Night and Marion Wiesel’s 2006 translation:

It was daytime when I awoke. I went to look for my father. (Feb. 2nd)

[…]

On the third day after our arrival at Buchenwald, everyone had to go to the showers [his father went too-cy]. Even the sick who had to go through last. (Feb 4th) […] Struck down by dysentery, my father lay in his bunk, five other invalids with him. I sat by his side watching him … A week went by like this. (Feb. 11th or Feb. 8th depending on how you read it)

[ . . . ]

When I got down after roll call, I could see his lips trembling as he murmured something. […] Then I had to go to bed. I climbed into my bunk, above my father, who was still alive. It was January 28, 1945. (still Feb. 8 or 11) I awoke on January 29 at dawn. In my father’s place lay another invalid. They must have taken him away before dawn and carried him to the crematory.” (Feb 12th or 9th) [Stella Rodway translation, pp 107-112]

The timeline in Un di velt is not in doubt:

On the seventh or eighth day of our being in Buchenwald, the bunk-elder [should be block-elder -cy) who used to deal out bread for the whole bunk [sic], came to me. . . .

[ . . . ]

On the same day, in the evening, disaster struck. The end. During roll call. The healthy had to go out of the block in order to be counted by the S.S. men. The sick stayed in their bunks. My father and I thus stayed inside. He — because of his dysentery and I — because of my bandaged foot. Father was lying in the lowest bunk and I — in the uppermost.

[ . . . ]

After roll call, I immediately jumped down from the uppermost bunk and ran to him. He was still breathing. But — he was silent.

[ . . . ]

For a couple of hours I stayed by him and looked at his face long and well […] Then they forced me to go lie down to sleep. I climbed up to the uppermost bunk and I did not know that in the morning, on awakening, I would find my father no more.

It was the eighteenth of Shevat, 5705.

* * *

Nineteenth of Shevat. Early in the morning.

I got up and ran to my father. Another sick man was lying in his place.

I had a father no more. (pp 233-238)

Readers might be surprised to learn that the Hebrew calendar date of 18-19 Shevat, 5705 corresponds to February 1-2, 1945! How neat is that? So, in Un di velt Father dies seven days after arrival, on the very same day as Abraham Viezel died, who was officially recorded at Buchenwald with the registration number of 123488 and the Auschwitz registration number of A-7712. (However, Un di velt also says that the trip from Gleiwitz to Buchenwald took ten days, which means they could not have arrived until sometime in February. Seven days from that time would not be Feb. 2nd.)

So can we conclude from this that Abraham is Shlomo? Not necessarily. The Yiddish author reports Father’s death as occurring during the night of 18-19 Shevat (Feb. 1-2), but Elie Wiesel, author of La Nuit, says the date is Jan. 28th! Why? Who can answer that but Elie Wiesel? He certainly knows what the month of Shevat and the year 5705 means … or he could have easily found out.

Or can we conclude that Un di velt was written by Lazar Wiesel, as Nikolaus Grüner claims … that he wrote his story as a father-son relationship … and that he was perhaps not the brother of Abraham as Grüner says he was? (It’s noted on Lazar’s Buchenwald file card that his father was also in Buchenwald; his mother in Auschwitz.) Well, again, not necessarily. There are other possibilities. But I’m getting ahead of myself.

The facts are, there are problems with all of these theories; none is a perfect fit. We can ask: If Elie Wiesel is the author of Un di velt hot geshvign, why did he change so many of the underpinning facts of the story when he rewrote it in French as La Nuit? This is a real head-scratcher. We can also ask: Why did Naomi Seidman, the Jewish professor who discussed in detail some of the differences between the Yiddish book and Night, not mention the 18th of Shevat? Is it because she couldn’t find an explanation for it? Siedman, Ruth Franklin and other Jewish reviewers have never brought up some of these Yiddish to French discrepancies. They are too embarrassing a problem for them.

What we can safely say is that no matter who the author of Un di velt was … he was totally unfamiliar with the real facts of when the Monowitz prisoners arrived at Buchenwald. Was it because he was not one of them? Was it because he was not concerned about accuracy since his story was directed at a non-critical audience—a Yiddish-speaking Jewish audience? As we continue, we’ll find more mystifications, but also a few certainties.

What happens to Eliezer after Father’s death?

Wiesel writes in Night (essentially the same in all translations):

I had to stay at Buchenwald until April eleventh. I have nothing to say of my life during this period. […] I was transferred to the children’s block, where there were six hundred of us. […] I spent my days in a state of total idleness. And I had one desire—to eat. I no longer thought of my father or of my mother. (SR, P 114)

He continues that on April 10, a general evacuation of the remainder of the camp—20,000 prisoners in all, including “several hundred children”—was begun but was soon interrupted. It resumed on the 11th but was again interrupted around ten a.m. when the camp inmate “resistance movement” rose up, firing guns. And then at 6 p.m. on that same day the first American tank arrived. This corresponds pretty well with the official story, but then it goes astray.

In a November 2000 interview with Oprah Winfrey, Wiesel recalled:

… and we [children] were left until the end. But every day we marched to the gate anyway. I was near the gate more than five times before I was released, and each time, the gate closed just before I came to it.

Ah, we have heard this before, haven’t we? As exaggerated as it sounds, in Un di velt the author goes even further. He writes:

I didn’t even bother to try hiding myself. Let myself be born along with the stream. Tens of times I stood before the iron camp gate, on the threshold of death, and always something happened which brought us back to the block.

Un di velt continues: “If I was not killed then it is merely thanks to almighty chance. For — because of the hunger, I even wanted to go to the gate: outside the gate, they were distributing bread and marmalade.”

Above:Elie interviewed by Oprah in 2000. Right: The front gate at Buchenwald, from the inside looking out, that Wiesel says he marched right up to “tens of times” but was always turned back!

Liberation brings Freedom and Revenge

UdV, P 244: The first gesture of freedom: the starved men made an effort to get something to eat. They only thought about food. Not about revenge. Not about their parents. Only about bread. And even when they had satisfied their hunger—they still did not think about revenge.

SR, P 115: Our first act as free men was to throw ourselves onto the provisions. We thought only of that. Not of revenge, not of our families. Nothing but bread.

Oprah Winfrey interview: Oprah asks, “After you were liberated, what did you do?” Wiesel answers: “The first thing many of us did was reassemble to say a prayer for the dead.” (page 5)

* * * *

UdV, P 244: Early the next day Jewish boys ran off to Weimar to steal clothing and potatoes. And to rape German girls [un tsu fargvaldikn daytshe shikses]. The historical commandment of revenge was not fulfilled.

LN, P 178: Le lendemain, quelques jeunes gens coururent à Weimar ramasser des pommes de terre et des habits—et coucher avec des filles. Mais de vengeance, pas trace.

SR, P 116: On the following day, some of the young men went to Weimar to get some potatoes and clothes—and to sleep with girls. But of revenge, not a sign.

MW, P115: The next day a few of the young men ran into Weimar to bring back some potatoes and clothes—and to sleep with girls. But still no trace of revenge.

In this case, Wiesel made the change from ‘rape’ to ‘sleep with’ in La Nuit. The expression for “German girls” that we find in the Yiddish book was also removed. The term that was actually used is shikses, a word which originally meant “abomination” and which is used today as a term of contempt for all non-Jewish women. In other words, in saying daytshe shikses, the author was expressing, in rather vulgar terms, his contempt and hatred for German women. This apparently was not good for the eyes of the Goyim to see. It was changed by Wiesel in the French La Nuit, and thus it never reached our eyes until now.

Yet, the Yiddish author goes even further and decries the failure of the Jewish males to take a proper revenge, which is here envisioned as a much larger public act of retribution than the “too mild” raping of German women. (Public retribution, of course, did come later with the Nuremberg Military Tribunals.)

Eliezer is hospitalized for two weeks—April 14 to April 28

UdV P 244: Three days after liberation I became very ill; food-poisoning. They took me to the hospital and the doctors said that I was gone. For two weeks I lay in the hospital between life and death. My situation grew worse from day to day.

SR P 116: Three days after the liberation I became very ill with food poisoning. I was transferred to the hospital and spent two weeks between life and death.

MW P 115: Three days after the liberation of Buchenwald, I became very ill: some form of poisoning. I was transferred to a hospital and spent two weeks between life and death.

Three days after liberation on April 11th is April 14th. Thus, Eliezer is in the hospital from April 14 until April 28—extremely ill, close to death. In his 1995 memoir, All Rivers Run to the Sea, Elie Wiesel claims that on that day (the 14th) he was thrown a can of lard, which he apparently ate although he doesn’t remember doing so. He lost consciousness and awoke in a hospital. But the addition of this story, which is in the original Un di velt, presents serious problems for Elie Wiesel. Perhaps the hospital story had slipped his mind when he decided to claim he was one of the survivors lying on a bunk in the “famous Buchenwald liberation photograph.” Because he was in the hospital …

He cannot be in the famous Buchenwald liberation photo taken on April 16 …

I have already demolished the false claim that Wiesel is in that photograph here. But on top of that, our translator found an interview of Leo Eitinger, a Jewish Czech-born psychiatrist, by Harry James Cargas, a friend and biographer of Elie Wiesel, which contained this gem:

HJC: The same thing happened with Livia Rothkirchen at Yad Vashem as happened with you. I was there doing research on atrocity photography for my book A Christian Response to the Holocaust and saw a photo that covers a large wall, of seventeen men lying in their bunks at liberation time. I think you’ve probably seen this picture. Wiesel and Dr. Rothkirchen passed it by many times, over a several-year period, before he told her he was in that photograph. I asked Elie if I could write something about it and he said, “No.” I wrote something and showed it to him and he gave me permission to publish it.

LE: I didn’t know Elie is in the photo.4

Cargas’ book was published in 1993, ten years after it was publicly announced that Elie Wiesel was in that photograph. Apart from the revelation that Cargas has to ask permission from Wiesel before he publishes anything about him, can you imagine that after walking by that famous photo for several years, Wiesel would finally think to say, “Oh hey, that’s me laying there, back in the shadows.”

Right: The photo at Yad Vashem in Israel with Elie Wiesel posing in front of it in 1986 after receiving the Nobel Peace Prize in Oslo.

He cannot have been present to agree to and sign the Military Questionaire on April 22 …

Much has been made by holocaust historians like Kenneth Waltzer and others I won’t name that this Fragebogen made out for Lázár Wiesel proves that Elie Wiesel was in Buchenwald. The birth date is not Elie’s; the date of arrest is not Elie’s; the signature is not Elie’s; the registration number belongs to another prisoner (Pavel Kun) who died only a month earlier; and on top of all that … Elie himself tells us in Night that he was lingering between life and death in the hospital on April 22. He was still six days away from having recovered enough to leave the hospital.

He cannot be in the photograph of the “Boys of Buchenwald” taken on April 27.

Kenneth Waltzer also claims on his Michigan State University website that Elie Wiesel is “seen to the left” (fourth from the front in left row wearing dark suit in front of the taller boy wearing a beret) in this photograph of the youths being transferred from the barracks inside Buchenwald to the former SS barracks on the outside. Why is Waltzer not paying attention to what is written in Night – that Eliezer was put in the hospital on the 14th of April, at death’s door, and remained for two weeks? One really has to wonder at the stupidity of holocaust historians. Or more likely — how stupid they think the rest of us are! See The Many Faces of Elie Wiesel.

The book’s ending: What does the long passage in Un di velt hot geshvign tell us?

UdV P 245: One fine day I got up—with the last of my energy—and went over to the mirror that was hanging on the wall. I wanted to see myself. I had not seen myself since the ghetto.

From the mirror a skeleton gazed out.

Skin and bones.

I saw the image of myself after my death. It was at that instant that the will to live was awakened.

Without knowing why, I raised a balled-up fist and smashed the mirror, breaking the image that lived within it.

And then—I fainted.

From that moment on my health began to improve.

I stayed in bed for a few more days, in the course of which I wrote the outline of the book you are holding in your hand, dear reader.

But—

Now, ten years after Buchenwald, I see that the world is forgetting. Germany is a sovereign state, the German army has been reborn. The bestial sadist of Buchenwald, Ilsa Koch, is happily raising her children. War criminals stroll in the streets of Hamburg and Munich. The past has been erased. Forgotten.

Germans and antisemites persuade the world that the story of the six million Jewish martyrs is a fantasy, and the naive world will probably believe them, if not today, then tomorrow or the next day.

So I thought it would be a good idea to publish a book based on the notes I wrote in Buchenwald.

I am not so naive to believe that this book will change history or shake people’s beliefs. Books no longer have the power they once had. Those who were silent yesterday will also be silent tomorrow. I often ask myself, now, ten years after Buchenwald:

Was it worth breaking that mirror? Was it worth it?

SR P 116: One day I was able to get up, after gathering all my strength. I wanted to see myself in the mirror hanging on the opposite wall. I had not seen myself since the ghetto.

From the depths of the mirror, a corpse gazed back at me.

The look in his eyes, as they stared into mine, has never left me.

MW P 115: One day when I was able to get up, I decided to look at myself in the mirror on the opposite wall. I had not seen myself since the ghetto.

From the depths of the mirror, a corpse was contemplating me.

The look in his eyes as he as he gazed at me has never left me.

The difference in length between the Yiddish and the English passage is the first thing that strikes us. The Yiddish writer had a lot to say in these final thoughts. He regained his “will to live” right there in the hospital. Twice he speaks of writing an outline and notes for Un di velt hot geshvign while still in his hospital bed. But there is no record by Elie Wiesel anywhere that says he did any writing in preparation for writing his “testimony” while in the camp (in fact, just the opposite), or at any time in advance of 1954.

The tragic true story of Ilse Koch is that she gave birth to one child while a prisoner of the Americans but she certainly was not allowed to raise him. She was hounded, vilified and persecuted after the war, retried by a German court in 1951 after being acquitted at the IMT, and ultimately given a life sentence—solely, it can be argued, to satisfy Jewish vengence. She committed suicide in prison in 1967.

Left: Ilse Koch on the witness stand in 1947. She was seven months pregnant and the only woman brought before the American Military Tribunals held at Dachau.

The Yiddish author also mentions the “six million Jewish martyrs” … in 1954. This number emerged from the Nuremberg Tribunals, but we know that claims of “six million Jewish victims” goes all the way back to the 1890’s.

All this and more was cut out for the French La Nuit (which, remember, was written by Wiesel) and the English versions which were taken from the French. As has been noted by Jewish commentators themselves, the Yiddish writer is an angry, politically-minded religious Jew who expected, or wished, the world to have been transformed by the travail of the Jews during WWII. He is bitterly disappointed. There is more in this final chapter of the Yiddish book that doesn’t appear in the French or English versions. Here is just one passage:

Dreams of truth, of freedom are false dreams for men. Visions of justice and equality are false visions for men. Man is: the struggle for bread, for meat; man is: the struggle to satisfy one’s own instincts.

Man is instinct to the core. Flesh to the core. And not heart. And not spirit. And not morality.

I learned that in Buchenwald. And what one learns in such conditions is without a doubt the truth, the purest truth. For man can really know man only in extreme conditions, when he has thrown away from himself all masks, social and psychological, and appears before us naked, as he is in truth.

In Buchenwald I saw the true face of man. The face of a human animal, which is worse than a true animal. O God, woe is you, woe is man, how trifling and puny. Ought you to even exist, if the son of Adam was made in your image!

God . . . I had ceased to believe in his existence. But despite that, I continued to believe in his evil. (UdV, P 240-41)

Was this written by Elie Wiesel? If it was, he is a man who has put on his own mask to play the game of Jewish vengence against the goyim persecutors of his people. In other parts of Night, Wiesel writes of losing his faith in a caring God, of no longer following his religion—but later he denied that is true, even though he wrote it! But this passage in Un di velt is too passionate to dismiss as merely a passing sense of discouragement. That is, of course, unless it is just a literary construct and doesn’t reflect any truth of the author.

What does it all mean?

The title of this two-part article is “What Changes were made to Elie Wiesel’s Night, and Why.” I didn’t promise to solve the mystery of the author of Un di velt hot geshvign, but I did hope I might do so, or at least eliminate some contenders.

I confess I expected there to be more difference between the Yiddish and the French books than it turns out to be. It is now clear that La Nuit was taken directly from Un di velt, although that doesn’t mean they were written by the same person. However, that is the greater likelihood unless it can be proven otherwise. Similarly, if Elie Wiesel is the author of Un di velt, it doesn’t mean he was in the camps. The fact that the books are filled with errors argues against it.

Night is a novel

It’s difficult to come to any certainties when the material we have to work with is so internally inconsistent and when there are several versions of it—similar in some ways to the many versions of the Anne Frank Diary. But we can conclude for certain that Night only works as a novel, not as an autobiography—no matter how much the Jewish spin doctors say that a memoir, to be a work of “great literature,” must include some fictional flights of fantasy. Nowhere does Night fit the facts. Even with wife Marion’s changes in 2006, it couldn’t be pulled together enough to make a convincing true-life testimony. And we know how many of these “survivor novels” there are around. It’s not like many other hopefuls didn’t have the same idea!

The Lazar-Lázár Riddle

In spite of all the above, I would like to propose a hypothetical scenario, one that I am not endorsing, for obvious reasons, but that does have the value of answering one of the more ignored aspects of this riddle, namely the way the 31-year-old Lazar Wiesel disappeared at the same time the 16-year-old Lázár Wiesel appeared. This cannot be denied. Thirty-one-year-old Lazar arrived at Buchenwald in January; sixteen-year-old Lázár left there in July. The easiest explanation for this is that Lazar wanted to have the papers of a 16-year-old Buchenwald orphan so he could be sent to France. In the confusion of the last months of the war and the immediate post-war period, this kind of thing became more possible. Such an explanation may sound a little far-fetched, but is it any harder to swallow than Elie Wiesel not having the tattoo (Auschwitz ID number) that he says he has? Or Elie Wiesel not having his own Buchenwald identification number, but “borrowing” a dead man’s (Pavel Kun, 2 years older than Elie) right before, or after, liberation? These things don’t make sense. Nor does the fact that in La Nuit Elie Wiesel wrote that his father died on Jan. 28, 1945, while in the Yiddish book that he also claims to have written as his own “testimony” the date is Feb. 2nd? Or that he wrote that the Russian Army took over the Auschwitz complex two days after its evacuation, which everyone knows is false?

Elie Wiesel even wrote in Night that his foot was operated on right before the evacuation of Auschwitz, while in his later real memoir, All Rivers Run to the Sea (pp 89-90), he flat-out recalled it as his knee, something that could not be mis-remembered. I could list many of these senseless “mistakes,” many of which I have written about in earlier articles.

There is something that doesn’t fit well into this Lazar-Lázár hypothesis, though—that is, that we have pictures of the real Elie Wiesel in France at the Jewish welfare orphanage, OSE. But how did he get through a year at Auschwitz and Buchenwald with no records of his being there … and a poor memory of what occurred and when? Did he somehow manage to attach himself to the Buchenwald transport with the stolen identity papers? But also, there are other ways he could have come to be at the Ecouis homes in France than in the children’s transport from Buchenwald. Just as there are other ways he could have come into possession of the Yiddish Un di velt without writing it himself.

Was Elie Wiesel in the camps?

My answer is still no. Wiesel could have been in some camps in some capacity under some auspices, but he is not telling the truth about what camp experience he did have. That means Hilda Wiesel Kudler is also not telling the truth but is standing by her brother. She says at the end of her bitter testimony to the Shoah Foundation, “I will not forget, and I will not forgive.” Have you ever wondered why Elie has not contributed a videotaped testimony to the Spielberg/USC Shoah Foundation library?

Wiesel’s other sister, who changed her name to Beatrice from Batia, never wrote or testified a word about it. She did go to work for Jewish organizations in Germany, however, immediately after the war, helping Jews to emigrate to wherever they wanted to go, including Palestine. The whole family were committed Zionists, as were most Eastern European/Russian Jews who were able to flood into the West because of the war. ‘Bea’ finally got her own papers to emigrate to Canada.

Left: Elie Wiesel with his older sisters Bea (left) and Hilda (right) in Paris after the war, exact date unknown.

A Jewish organization, Sharit Ha-Platah, gathered names of Jews who were liberated from Dachau and it’s many sub-camps and published them in 1946. This is the only record so far found with the names of Hilda and Beatrice Wiesel, and it is a self-identified list of Jews by Jews, not an official German record of forced laborers or prisoners. So the hard evidence for the Wiesel family is not there. It doesn’t mean they weren’t, however; it’s just that we’re left with believing what they say, because we want to or because we’re expected to.

The easiest option is to go along with Elie Wiesel’s story that he was in those camps, and question his credibility from other angles, such as the in-credible stories he tells. This is what revisionists had done before Nikolaus Grüner came along and released documents he had obtained from Buchenwald and the correspondence he had with the archivists there. These documents cannot be ignored, in spite of what other nonsense Grüner writes in his book Stolen Identity. These documents have caused a “sea change” in revisionism about Elie Wiesel, to the extent that it can be divided between pre-Grüner and post-Grüner research and writing.

Because of these documents, it is up to Elie Wiesel to come forth and answer questions about them. But being that he is completely unprepared to do so, this job has been given to his surrogates—Professor Waltzer for one. Kenneth Waltzer promised, with a lot of bombast, that he would produce proof that Elie is Lazar and that Shlomo is Abraham, but for a year now he has failed to produce it, or even say anything more about it. He has also failed to come out with his promised book, “The Rescue of Children and Youths at Buchenwald,” which was to include Elie Wiesel. In the opinion of this writer, Waltzer is as big a fraud as Wiesel, selling emotion and sentimentality instead of factual history. They are both supported with professorships at well-funded universities.

So, back to the main question: Was Elie Wiesel in Auschwitz and Buchenwald? As I said, my answer is still no … and no one should accept that he was without some further explanation from him, during which he subjects himself to questions. If he’s genuine, he can certainly withstand questions. That, however, is not going to happen because … fill in your own answer.

Elie Wiesel has kept the details of his life before 1955 vague. He has managed to prevent unwanted questions from being asked of him. He hides behind a stated aversion to “holocaust deniers” so that anyone who is not a 100% believer is not welcome in his company. He gets away with the ‘moral outrage’ he professes toward anyone who doubts, thus no interviewer, reporter, writer, academic, student or even President dares to doubt in his presence. It works like a charm.

Endnotes

1. Danuta Czech, Auschwitz Chronicle: 1939-1945. New York: Henry Holt, 1997

2. APMO, D-Bu 3/17, pp. 18-85, 87 (transport list as cited by Czech in Auschwitz Chronicle)

3. Hilda was obviously unaware that the march itself was only 24 hours, probably because she had heard so many false and exaggerated stories about “endless days of marching” that proliferate in survivor stories.

4. Harry James Cargas, ed. Voices from the Holocaust, Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 1993. pp. 116-22.

The next chapter is by Prof. Dr. Fritz Münch, titled: Zum Recht der Kriegsgefangenschaft (The Rights of Prisoners of War).

The author tells us that existing law concerning POWs is relatively new, going into some detail regarding the Hague Rules of Warfare and the Geneva Convention. He also states that during WWII all of the belligerent parties were signatories to those agreements, except for the Soviet Union (SU). The Communist/Bolshevik regime of the SU considered all agreements signed by the Czarist government null and void, but the overwhelming majority of public opinion assumed that the SU would honor those agreements, since they had become part of international law (p. 15ff). The book under discussion proves this wrong; also, there is no such thing as “International Law,” only agreements between states.

On p. 18 Münch begins addressing the real issue, the partisan problem, which has now moved increasingly into the background: the intent is to depict German soldiers as indiscriminate murderers, who killed at will for no reason and combed the vastness of Russian territory in search of Jews to exterminate them. But the partisans were real and the subject of illegal combatants and legality of reprisal is part of the subject here; the book provides ample material regarding partisan activity, but first a little about the emergence of the partisan problem.

Münch writes that the partisan problem arose for the first time in 1899, at this time only effecting Belgium and Switzerland. A compromise was reached, allowing for the populace to organize and fight the approaching enemy, but that – when the territory was occupied – civilians had to cease fighting. This never solved the problem, so later an attempt was made to establish rules concerning the difference between legal and illegal combatants, which is addressed in some detail later. This early imprecise interpretation led to misunderstandings already in WWI. The author continues by writing that it is impossible to provide sufficient care for POWs as stipulated by the Hague Rules: “63. In the absence of a special agreement between the belligerents, prisoners of war shall be treated, as regards board, lodging, and clothing, on the same footing as the troops of the Government that captured them” when whole armies are captured, as has been shown during and after WWII. He then summarizes the shortcomings during the German POW trials, the IMT et al:

- treatment of prisoners as criminals without providing evidence that the Rules of Warfare were violated.

- discarding the Rules of War by asserting that Germany as a state has ceased to exist.

And finally, failure to discharge prisoners of war after hostilities ceased and employment of these prisoners in dangerous jobs.

Münch then refers to the “Geneva Convention relative to the ‘Treatment of Prisoners of War’” of 1949, enforced on October 21, 1950, in which some of the issues were addressed, retroactively. He quotes from Article 84, which states:

“A prisoner of war shall be tried only by a military court, unless the existing laws of the Detaining Power expressly permit the civil courts to try a member of the armed forces of the Detaining Power in respect of the particular offence alleged to have been committed by the prisoner of war.

In no circumstances whatever shall a prisoner of war be tried by a court of any kind which does not offer the essential guarantees of independence and impartiality as generally recognized, and, in particular, the procedure of which does not afford the accused the rights and means of defence provided for in Article 105.”

And Article 99, the first paragraph:

“No prisoner of war may be tried or sentenced for an act which is not forbidden by the law of the Detaining Power or by international law, in force at the time the said act was committed.”

Anyone even vaguely familiar with proceedings of the “International Military Tribunal” (IMT) at Nuremberg in 1945-46 will have to ask: why now; why were the German military personnel accused of all sorts of crimes not explicitly declared illegal by German laws and not addressed in detail by international agreements, termed “International Law”? After all, what was agreed upon in 1949 did not exist in WWII, as the laws used to convict Germans were written in London after the fact. Article 99 is notable: it forbids the sentencing of POWs based on ex post facto law (written after the fact; p. 21) And that is exactly what happened at Nuremberg, as addressed later on.

We then learn that a Stockholm Institute determined that from 1945 to 1969 – 90 international conflicts occurred, the number of victims allegedly equal to that of WWII. Eugene Davidson writes much the same in his The Nuremberg Fallacies, making a mockery of what Justice Jackson – and I am having a real problem with the word ‘justice’ before Jackson’s name – wrote on June 7, 1945 in his letter to the President:

“In arranging these trials we must also bear in mind the aspirations with which our people have faced the sacrifices of war. After we entered the war, and as we expended our men and our wealth to stamp out these wrongs, it was the universal feeling of our people that out of this war should come unmistakable rules and workable machinery from which any who might contemplate another era of brigandage would know that they would be held personally responsible and would be personally punished. Our people have been waiting for these trials in the spirit of Woodrow Wilson, who hoped to “give to international law the kind of vitality which it can only have if it is a real expression of our moral judgment.”

No other trial took place as a result of the wars mentioned above; no one was punished for crimes committed as the Germans were, and that even with agreements now in existence. Also, morally is not now – or has it ever been – a part of the criminal justice system, it is only the letter of the law that counts.

Münch closes his essay by stating that it would have been best, since no explicit “international” laws existed during WWII, for each country to try their own soldiers based on lex loci, the law of the land, instead of applying law written after the fact and covering up the crimes committed by the victorious powers. But, as shown above by the IMT president’s statement concerning the one-sidedness of proceedings, the intent was not to administer justice at the IMT, or the follow up trials, but to convict the Germans.

Not much needs to be added to this: victors’ ‘justice’ at its finest, vae victis indeed.

About the (now nonexistent) Partisans.

Before continuing with the book review, some general comments on the partisans – the underlying issue. For it was the reprisals by the Germans, including the actions of the EG, (Einsatzgruppen; rapid response units) – formed by the Germans to combat partisans – which were declared to be war crimes by the IMT judges, the measures taken considered to be in breach of “international law”. The judges ignored the partisans almost completely, and consequently the counter-measures taken by the Germans to fight the partisans are now considered to be almost exclusively ‘Jew killing’ actions. It is beyond the scope of this work to address this nonsense about a few thousand German soldiers scouring the vast Russian landscape on the lookout for Jews, – none of the alleged ‘dozens of mass graves’ have ever been discovered – this is to show that partisans were a huge problem, a war deciding issue, and that reprisals by the Germans were justified, though largely ineffective.

To the definition of combatants as per the: “Convention (IV) respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land and its annex: Regulations concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land. The Hague, 18 October 1907”, in force at that time:

“CHAPTER I
The qualifications of belligerents
Article 1. The laws, rights, and duties of war apply not only to armies, but also to militia and volunteer
corps fulfilling the following conditions:
1. To be commanded by a person responsible for his subordinates;
2. To have a fixed distinctive emblem recognizable at a distance;
3. To carry arms openly; and
4. To conduct their operations in accordance with the laws and customs of war.
In countries where militia or volunteer corps constitute the army, or form part of it, they are included under the denomination “army.”
Art. 2. The inhabitants of a territory which has not been occupied, who, on the approach of the enemy, spontaneously take up arms to resist the invading troops without having had time to organize themselves in accordance with Article 1, shall be regarded as belligerents if they carry arms openly and if they respect the laws and customs of war.
Art. 3. The armed forces of the belligerent parties may consist of combatants and non-combatants. In the case of capture by the enemy, both have a right to be treated as prisoners of war.”(http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/full/195)

Partisans, by definition, could never adhere to those rules; they have to operate under cover if they hope to be successful. During the war, the soldiers coming home on leave from the eastern front frequently talked about partisans, the word in everyone’s moth, I remember it well. We also have, for just one example, a war time publication by the Soviet War News, published by Hutchinson & Co. (Publishers) Ltd., London, New York, and Melbourne, by authority of “Soviet War News”, issued by the press department of the Soviet Embassy in London (this was sent to me; the article is not dated, but is apparently a 1942 issue). It is “An Account of the Work of Soviet Partisans behind the Nazi lines”, the essay titled: “We Are Guerillas”. Here is the introduction in its entirety:

“What is a guerilla? He is defined in dictionaries as “one engaged in irregular warfare, generally in small independent bodies”. The term is derived from the Spanish guerra, meaning war, and guerillas were the main force which prevented Napoleon from ever completely conquering Spain. And the same guerillas, in their Russian form, harassed Napoleon unmercifully when he invaded Russia in 1812.

In Russia, guerillas are generally called “partizans”. They developed as a fighting force with a tradition all their own, during the years of civil war which followed the Soviet revolution in 1917. While a life-and-death struggle was going on between Whites and Reds—between those who wanted to restore the inequalities of the old regime and those who supported the government of the people—thousands of men and women, mostly peasants, joined the guerillas.

Brave and skilful leaders sprang out of their ranks, men like Chapayev and Shchors, of whose exploits colorful sagas have now passed into the rich folk-lore of the Russian people. In the rolling plains of the Ukraine, the marshes of the Dnieper, the Cossack lands around the Don, and in the barren steppes of Siberia, everywhere the partizans fought untiringly to help the then young Red Army against the enemies of the Soviets.

That was just over twenty years ago. There are still thousands of men in the Soviet Union today who fought with Chapayev and other partizan leaders, who remember the old traditions of guerilla warfare, and who have not forgotten how to deal with invaders.

From the very first days of the German Invasion in June 1941, guerilla bands were formed wherever the enemy appeared. After Stalin’s call to the nation on July 3, when he urged the Soviet people to create in the German rear “conditions impossible for the enemy” the guerilla movement spread like wildfire.

Once again brilliant leaders sprang up everywhere. Literally thousands of detachments were formed. Men, women and even children are fighting in these detachments, pitting their bravery and native ingenuity against the mechanized juggernaut pt Nazism. They are a source of constant terror to the German troops, who can never be sure that an innocent-looking clump of bushes does not conceal a machine-gun, or that a simple peasant girl is not carrying a hand-grenade in her market basket.

While the major portion of this book is concerned with the tactics and operations of Soviet guerillas, the heroic struggle of guerillas in other parts of Nazi-occupied Europe receives its share. From Finland in the north, through Central Europe to Greece in the south, the trail of guerilla fire is here laid in (the German and Italian rear).

This fiery trail is growing every day fiercer. The guerilla movement is the foundation of a new people’s army which will one day link up with the regular Allied forces to smash Fascism from the face of Europe.”

And this is what the German fighting forces were up against, never knowing when a shot would ring out from somewhere killing a comrade, or when a bomb would explode destroying rail lines and killing soldiers, or if bridges would be blown up, etc., etc.; never knowing who to trust, as even women and children participated in this illegal warfare. The Germans did their best, but were powerless to stop the activities because of the sheer numbers of partisans involved. And the “partizans” were not a rag-tag group, but part of the Red Army. On May 30, 1942 the administrative unit of the partisan movement was formed under the command of General P.K. Ponomarenko. From then on the partisan army was considered to be equal to other groups of the Red Army: infantry, air force and navy, and were called: “Soldiers of the Red Army operating behind enemy lines.” (Franz. W. Seidler, Die Wehrmacht im Partisanenkrieg, Pour le Mérite-Verlag für Militärgeschichte, Selent 1999, pp. 24-5)

But even before May 1942, partisans were led and supplied by the Red Army, the appointment of Ponomarenko just made it official. And now a little about numbers: at the end of 1943, Ponomarenko proudly published the results of 2 years’ ‘work’: 300,000 German soldiers were killed, among them 30 generals and 6,000 officers; 3,000 trains derailed; 3,263 bridges destroyed; 859 munitions depots blown up. In 1961 an official account followed, published in Moscow under the title “Sowetskie Partizani”: 500,000 German soldiers, officers, members of the SS and police, as well as train crews had been murdered. In a different publication the following numbers are provided: 18,000 military trains destroyed; about 500,000 explosive charges activated; 42,000 trucks destroyed; 2,000 rail- and 8,000 street bridges destroyed; 9,400 locomotives and 85,000 rail cars destroyed. (Ibid, pp. 36-7)

Following the war, partisans were praised and honored, especially in Russia but in other eastern countries as well. In an East German publication we read that in the SU, 1,933,000 partisans were active: 250,000 in Bulgaria; 500,000 in Yugoslavia (this is confirmed in the book under discussion, p. 27); in Poland 350,000; more numbers for other countries are provided, totaling 4,409,500 illegal combatants fighting the German forces. (Atlas Zur Geschichte, Band 2, VEB Hermann Haack, Geographisch-Kartographische Anstalt Gotha/Leipzig 1975, p. 46). The map also shows huge areas completely under partisan control.

In spite of all this we are still told that the EG were ‘Jew killing’ units exclusively! In 2009, for instance, a National Geographic documentary was produced with the title “Nazi Death Squads”, referring to the EG. One of the ‘historians’ participating in this vile piece of hate propaganda, Richard Rhodes, told the audience “that he had nightmares dealing with this material, but pushed through those feelings to tell the story.” Historians, he continued, still claim that the death camps were the centers of the killings, with the EG killings “shrugged off as wild excesses,” because historians are unwilling to confront this material. To call this guy deluded is praising him, but he has one thing right. Lately – because the numbers of Jews allegedly killed in concentration camps is revised downward almost daily – the ‘crime scene’ is increasingly being shifted to alleged mass murders of Jews in the east, “in ditches,” as these numbers are impossible to verify (Saul Friedländer, The Years of Extermination: Nazi Germany and the Jews, 1939-1945, 2007). The NG documentary used to be available online, but no longer. I taped the show.

As mentioned in the introduction to We are Guerillas, in a radio address of July 3, 1941, Stalin called on the Soviet people to resist and form partisan units:

“In case of a forced retreat of Red Army units, all rolling stock must be evacuated; the enemy must not be left a single engine, a single railway car, not a single pound of grain or gallon of fuel. The collective farmers must drive off all their cattle and turn over their grain to the safe keeping of the state authorities for transportation to the rear. All valuable property, including non-ferrous metals, grain and fuel that cannot be withdrawn must be destroyed without fail.

In areas occupied by the enemy, guerilla units, mounted and on loot, must be formed; sabotage groups must be organized to combat enemy units, to foment guerilla warfare everywhere, blow up bridges and roads, damage telephone and telegraph lines, set fire to forests, stores and transports. In occupied regions conditions must be made unbearable for the enemy and all his accomplices. They must be hounded and annihilated at every step, and all their measures frustrated.”

This call went out before even two weeks passed following the German preventive strike of June 22 code named “Barbarossa”. Is it possible to form partisan units in as short a time as this? No, and we have evidence that partisans were organized and trained well in advance, with details provided later. But first the follow up order by Stalin called “Stavka Order No. 0428” of November 17, 1941. Stavka translates roughly into ‘High Command’ of which Stalin was in charge from July 10, 1941 onward (Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte, Heft 4, 2000, p. 667):

“The Stavka of the Supreme Commander orders the following:

1. All villages situated in the hinterland of the German forces, to a depth of 40 to 60 kilometres from the front line and 20 to 30 kilometres to the left and right of the roads, are to be destroyed and reduced to rubble. Air forces are to be immediately brought in to assist in the destruction of the villages in the required operational radius, and also sufficient artillery and mortar fire, reconnaissance and ski details, together with partisan sabotage groups equipped with incendiary bottles,

2. In each regiment special details of 20 to 30 men are to be formed in order to dynamite and burn down die villages. Particularly courageous men who act boldly in destroying the villages are to be recommended for a government decoration…”

(http://books.google.ca/books?id=aESBIpIm6UcC&pg=PA471&lpg=PA471&dq=Stalin%27s+Stavka+order+No+0428&source=bl&ots=3FiwAKbr23&sig=1CGQkuABjJ0pz0pJ0OLINdgK7lA&hl=en&sa=X&ei=-Zg T_DaGoSPigL536yrAQ&sqi=2&ved=0CB4Q6AEwAA#v=onepage&q=Stalin%27s%20Stavka%20order%20No.%200428&f=false)

The aforementioned “Vierteljahrshefte…” by the IfZ (Institute for Contemporary History) has a full copy of the order in German, as discovered in Moscow archives. There is some controversy swirling around this order, though not about the above wording: some allege that it contained a section about the Soviet soldiers/partisans having to dress in German uniforms, to stir up hatred toward the Germans, because many Russians welcomed the arrival of the Germans. The authors of the IfZ article, Christian Hartmann and Jürgen Zarusky, discard this; what they found in Russian archives as well as in the Washington National Archives (Series 429, Roll 461) contains nothing of the sort. I do not doubt this order was given, but Stalin was surely not foolish enough to put it on paper. There is ample evidence, however, of partisans et al. wearing German uniforms, since German soldiers were routinely found naked and mutilated. Prof. Seidler, for instance, writes that more and more partisans were wearing German uniforms and that the number of foreigners, who had been employed as helpers (HIWIS) or as local policemen, deserting in German uniforms was steadily increasing (Seidler, p.34; Report by the Reichskommisar for Ukraine of June 25, 1943, Bundesarchiv Berlin, BDC O.217 II, Bl.108ff).

These Stalin orders were followed, with civilians the targets. Efforts were then made to make it look like Germans committed these crimes, this cannot be proven for obvious reasons, but the destruction was real: the Tätigkeits und Lageberichte (Action and situation reports, TuL) issued by the EG provide ample evidence of the destruction left behind by the retreating Red Army troops as well as acts of sabotage committed while the territory was occupied by the Germans (the TuL are contained in Die Einsatzgruppen in der besetzten Sowjetunion 1941/1942, by Peter Klein. I have copies of them; the book itself seems to have fallen into the black hole, as I am not able to find a copy). Wearing of German uniforms by enemy soldiers and partisans is also mentioned in the book under discussion—part of the subject in the next chapters. But rest assured that all the destruction and killings done by the Russians were blamed on the Germans after the war. Marina Sorokina, a Russian historian, published a related article in Kritika titled “People and Procedures”, a very informative essay critical of the “investigations” undertaken by the “Extraordinary State Commission” (ESC) formed by the Soviets to collect evidence of alleged German crimes.

She writes in regard to this issue:

“At the same time, the postwar years saw the publication in the USSR of a number of memoirs, written in the genre of the heroic saga by local Soviet and party figures who had participated firsthand in fulfilling Stalin’s directive. These memoirs contain a multitude of examples of the destruction of industrial and agricultural enterprises before the arrival of the enemy…Nearly a half-century later, it must be recognized that the Stalinist plan to create the phantom of a “public prosecutor” of fascism was a success. The ChGK (ESC) fulfilled its representational function during the war years, and in the postwar years faithfully kept the topic of “war crimes” sealed off from Soviet society. The documentary materials it created and collected, however, have turned out to be the latest Russian mass grave. In the process of excavating it, historians will for a long time to come be faced with the sometimes fruitless task of distinguishing “ours” from “others,” and executioners from victims.” (Marina Sorokina, People and Procedures, Slavica Publishers, Indiana University, Kritika Fall 2005, p.830, footnote 107 and p. 831, as well as a series of IV articles available at http://www.revblog.codoh.com/2011/06/).

Efforts are now made by some Russian historians to separate “ours” from “others”, but too much rests on the official version of history – as presented – to be maintained. Therefore I have little hope that the truth will be told anytime soon.

To be continued….

The following essays are based mostly on “Verbrechen der Sieger. Das Schicksal der deutschen Kriegsgefangenen in Osteuropa”(Crimes of the victors. The fate of German POWs in Eastern Europe, Druffel-Verlag, Leoni am Starnberger See, 1975). It begins with a foreword by Brigadier General Wolfgang Schall, retired, POW in the SU (Soviet Union) from 1945 to 1955, as well as a statement of intent by Wilhelm Anders. No actual author is mentioned; it is a compilation of documents and witness statements by the Verband der Heimkehrer und Bund der Vertriebenen (Organization of Returnees and Organization of the Dispelled). They decided to publish this book in 1975 – as preparation for the celebration of the 30th anniversary of Germany’s defeat, and the distortions of history affiliated with that defeat – were underway.

Since then, many books have been written defaming German soldiers, portraying them as brutal killers. The latest effort by Sönke Neitzel and Harald Welzer, simply titled “Soldaten” (Soldiers), features a collection of ‘newly discovered‘ British and American wiretaps, allegedly of conversations of German POWs in various camps. And of course there was the 1995-1999 exhibition, “Vernichtungskrieg. Verbrechen der Wehrmacht 1941 bis 1994”(War of Annihilation: Crimes of the German armed forces 1941-1945), produced by the Hamburge Institut für Sozialforschung (Hamburg Institute for Social Research), with its many distortions and outright lies, addressed by Walter Post in “Die Verleumdete Armee” (The defamed army, Pour le Mérite, 1999). These are just two of many examples of German scribblers, who call themselves historians, distorting history. But all of them ignore the book under discussion.

W. Schall writes, on p.7:

“Was die Wissenschaftliche Kommission für deutsche Kriegsgefangenengeschichte in fünfzehn Bänden und mehreren Beiheften an Zeugnissen zusammengetragen hat, ist ein Epos des Grauens und Leidens, das oft jede Phantasie übersteigt. Und doch haben wir es erlebt und sind Zeugen — soweit wir die Heimat wiedersehen durften“.

(The fifteen volumes of testimonies, compiled by the Scientific Commission for Prisoner of War History, tell of an epoch of horror and sufferings straining the imagination. But we did experience it and are witnesses – those of us, at least, who were fortunate enough to return home.)

Mr. Schall tells us that an official body did gather evidence of crimes committed by the victors, consisting of documents as well as testimonies: a fifteen volume endeavor. Prof. Seidler writes that the Wehrmacht (Third Reich fighting force) investigations documented 8,000 cases, including crimes committed by partisans on German soldiers, the results are contained in 226 folders. The whole of it was taken to the USA and only returned in 1968, with many of the files missing (Franz W. Seidler, Die Wehrmacht im Partisanenkrieg, Pour le Mérite-Verlag für Militärgeschichte, Selent, Austria 1999, p. 87). Prof. Seidler also writes that at the end of the war the Allies were not able to prove that Germans violated that elusive “International Law”; Germans, however, had documented numerous cases of the Allies doing so (Ibid, p. 89). The President – during the IMT proceedings of May 16, 1946 – prevented the German defense counsel Dr. Laternser from pointing this out, stating:

“We are not trying whether any other powers have committed breaches of international law, or crimes against humanity, or war crimes; we are trying whether these defendants have.” (http://avalon.law.yale.edu/imt/05-14-46.asp , p. 521)

Victor’s ‘justice’ at its finest. What happened to this fifteen volume magnum opus? W. Anders writes on p. 9:

“In einem Telegramm an den Bundeskanzler forderte das Präsidium des Verbandes der Heimkehrer die „sofortige Freigabe der unter Verschluß liegenden deutschen Kriegsgefangenen-Dokumentation durch die Bundesregierung”.

(The steering committee of the [abovementioned] organization, in a telegram to the German chancellor, is demanding that the POW documents still under closure be released immediately.)

Why would this material be, to this day, under lock and key? If reconciliation is the aim, or “never again”, is it not of utmost importance that the truth is told and all sides heard? Apparently not, since finger pointing directed solely at the Germans continues unabated. And this one-sidedness is supposed to be the basis of understanding between peoples? Never!

W. Anders titled his introduction: “Warum dieses Buch geschrieben wurde” (Why this book was written). It starts out with a declaration by the Organization (I will refer to the Verband der Heimkehrer as the Organization), an appeal to Germans for unity:

„Zur Würde eines jeden Menschen gehört sein guter Ruf. Ohne Grund und leichtfertig darf er nicht in Frage gestellt werden. Dies gilt auch für die Deutschen.

Der überwältigende Teil der deutschen Soldaten hat nicht für eine unmenschliche Diktatur, sondern in Erfüllung der Pflichten für Volk und Vaterland gekämpft. Unser Volk darf diese Soldaten nicht als imperialistische Faschisten-Horden beschimpfen lassen. Es ist aufgerufen, sich in Wahrung seiner Selbstachtung dagegen zu wehren.

Wir verschweigen kein Unrecht, das Deutsche begangen haben. Wir wehren uns aber dagegen, daß jede Erwähnung des schweren Unrechts, das an Deutschen begangen wurde, unterdrückt wird. Wir rechnen nichts auf, aber verwahren uns gegen jede Geschichtsklitterung und gegen jede einseitige Dokumentation“.

(Part of everyone’s dignity is a good reputation; it must not be jeopardized. This also applies to Germans.

The overwhelming majority of German soldiers did not fight to protect an inhuman regime, but considered it their duty to fight for their nation. Our people must not be allowed to defame those soldiers as imperialistic fascist hordes. We call upon them to defend them, so as to sustain their own dignity.

We are not interested in covering up injustices committed by Germans. We are however protesting against the cover up of the injustices committed against us Germans. We are not interested in finger pointing, but are against the distortion of history and the one-sided portrayal of history.)

The book was published based on documents and testimony supplied be members of that organization and because the German government refused to publish the material. And also because of the waves of propaganda emanating from the east about “German criminals” alongside portrayals of the Soviet army as the “most humane army in the world”, this according to a TASS release (p. 11). Novosti, a Russian daily, praised the immediate help provided by the Red Army, supplying necessary goods for civilians (Actually they stole everything they could get their hands on; I witnessed some of it. Wilf). The article continued to say that the treatment of German POWs was “beyond reproach” and in compliance with the Geneva Convention, which surprised the POWs (p. 10). Here’s a comment by the Organization, on the same page:

“Dies ist ein Hohn auf die 1,2 Millionen in sowjetischen Lagern umgekommenen deutschen Kriegsgefangenen und Hunderttausender von Heimkehrern, die nach ihrer Entlassung in der Heimat vor Entkräftung verstorben oder heute noch schwer gesundheitsgeschädigt sind“.

(This makes a mockery of the 1.2 million German POWs who died in Soviet captivity, as well as of the hundreds of thousands who died at home as a result of malnutrition or are still suffering from the effects of ill treatment.)

The “Voice of the GRD” (Stimme der DDR) on April 26, 1975 asked why German fathers and sons were killed. Their answer: they were part of a “fascist campaign of conquest” and it is therefore a fact “that every German soldier was a participant in the biggest crime in European history.” This is how every German soldier was branded a “war criminal,” a practice originating from propaganda at that time and now accepted as fact by “historians” and the public. The Czech news agency PAP stated on the same day that “German soldiers were kept a little longer in POW camps because of their dishonorable fighting practices.” This “little longer” meant ten years for many, violating all international agreements regarding treatment of POWs.

But, there appears to have been some concern in the East about the truth emerging. On March 20, 1975 – keep in mind that this hype was all about the 30^th anniversary of the defeat of the “German Fascists” and the May 8^th celebrations – Radio Moscow raised concerns about “curious news” coming from Bonn (the German capital then), of the pending release of “disreputable (berüchtigte) documents concerning crimes allegedly committed on German soldiers during the war,” and that the publication of this material would be considered a new “provocation.” Radio Moscow continued to say that in this document, “soldiers and partisans of the SU, Poland, Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, in fact the whole of the antifascist organizations, are defamed.” A comment by the authors: “Whoever experienced the malicious and devious tactics used by the partisans will have to agree that it is not a defamation, but fact.” (p. 11)

No effort was spared to prevent the publication of the 17 volume documentary, as well as the book under discussion: the eastern paranoia suggesting that details were known and publication was feared. “The intent was to exonerate the Germans and defame the Red Army”: that according to the eastern mass media. “Izvestia” on March 1, 1975 called the documentary “dirty rubbish” (diesen dreckigen Plunder); Radio Prague talked of a “neofascist provocation”; Radio Moscow informed its listeners that this was “in contrast…to the spirit and contents of the agreements signed with the socialist countries,” referring to the 1975 Helsinki accord then in preparation.

As expected, the German government, no doubt ‘encouraged’ by others, caved in. Government spokesman Bölling declared on February 4, 1975, even before the big push from the East, that although the facts cannot be denied and he has no reason to doubt any of it, he is against publication of the documents because it would nullify all efforts made by German governments. “By our policy we have for years tried to come to an understanding with other countries, to overcome the problems of crimes committed by Germans and on Germans.” And he considers it bad politics that this issue “is pushed to the fore and used by those not interested in conciliation.” (pp. 12, 13)

The authors protest against this interpretation, especially the last sentence. It is not them who are preventing conciliation, but the East that continues to distort facts, portraying German soldiers as criminals and the others as saints. It is not the Organization’s intention to shift the blame, but to present facts to prevent this subject from being used as a “political club.” Soldiers especially are interested in peace, but if one side continually sabotages every effort at coming to an understanding, by distorting facts, peace cannot be achieved.

Wilhelm Anders closed his deliberation by stating that, according to a poll, 55% of Germans are in favor of addressing this issue fairly. He asks, “Are they all “Neofascists, Revanchists or Enemies of Détente?” One has to wonder if 30 years plus later 55% of Germans would still welcome a fair reworking of history. I doubt it; it appears that most Germans today are satisfied with distorted history and are comfortable with their guilty role. This is a disturbing development: the intended “re-education,” or brainwashing, has taken effect.

To be continued….

In late December 2011, we received a long text entitled Holocaust Denial and Operation Reinhard. A Critique of the Falsehoods of Mattogno, Graf and Kues. The authors are Jonathan Harrison, Roberto Muehlenkamp, Jason Myers, Sergey Romanov and Nicholas Terry. The object of their critique are the following three books:

• Mattogno, Carlo, Jürgen Graf, Treblinka: Extermination Camp or Transit Camp?, Theses & Dissertation Press, Chicago 2004.
• Mattogno, Carlo, Belzec in Propaganda, Testimonies, Archeological Research and History, Theses & Dissertation Press, Chicago 2004.
• Graf, Jürgen, Thomas Kues and Carlo Mattogno, Sobibór. Holocaust Propaganda and Reality, The Barnes Review, Washington DC 2010.

It stands to reason that we could not afford to ignore such a challenge because this would have been tantamount to surrender. Initially we considered contenting ourselves with a summary reply, pointing out the most glaring fallacies and idiocies in the arguments of our opponents, but we then decided to use the „steam roller method“ instead, discussing and refuting all major arguments our five adversaries adduce in their paper.

This means that our response will be extremely long (several hundreds of pages). The bulk of our rebuttal will be written by Carlo Mattogno. This is inevitable because Mattogno, being the most prolific of us, is the main target of our adversaries’ attacks. Since Mattogno’s part will have to be translated from Italian into English, this alone will inevitably delay the publication of our reply, not to mention the fact that the three of us will have to coordinate our texts in order to reduce the inevitable repetitions to a minimum.

Should Caroline Sturdy Colls publish her paper about her archeological research at Treblinka before we have finished our rebuttal, Thomas Kues will include an analysis of her results in his chapter on the excavations at Belzec and Sobibor.

For the aforementioned reasons, our response will probably not be ready before July or August. Much to our regret, this delays the beginning of our study upon the Einsatzgruppen. On the other hand, after the publication of our reply we will not have the slightest obligation to pay any further attention to anything MM. Harrison, Mühlenkamp, Myers, Romanov and Terry might publish in the future.

12 March 2012 Carlo Mattogno, Jürgen Graf, Thomas Kues

On Tuesday, January 17, 2006, Amazon.com announced that it was changing the categorization of a new translation of Elie Wiesel’s Night from novel to memoir.

Amazon would also revise the editorial description of the original edition to make clear that they consider the book a memoir, not a novel. “We hope to make these changes as quickly as possible,” said Jani Strand, a spokeswoman for the online retailer. The day before, Oprah Winfrey had announced that Night was her latest book club choice, displacing her previous selection, James Frey’s A Million Little Pieces.

The sudden switch from fiction to non-fiction caused some discussion and questions, which Strand brushed away by saying, “Amazon.com’s data source for the Oprah Book Club edition of Night inaccurately classified the book as fiction.” She declined to offer details. The book, re-classified as “Autobiography” and blessed by Oprah, was already No.3 on Amazon.com as of that Tuesday afternoon! Wiesel, interviewed later with his literary agent Georges Borchardt, insisted they had never portrayed it as a novel.

But the publisher did.1 There has been confusion about the question for so long—even Wiesel’s defenders have to admit it. Ruth Franklin, in her 2011 book, A Thousand Darknesses, wrote: “Unfortunately, Night is an imperfect ambassador for the infallibility of the memoir, owing to the fact that it has been treated very often as a novel—by journalists, by scholars, and even by its publishers.”2 On Night’s Wikipedia page it has long been described as autobiography, memoir, novel—yes, all three. How long will that continue? As long as there are editions of Night that still sport those labels, one assumes.

Left: Oprah Winfrey and Elie Wiesel pose together at the Elie Wiesel Foundation for Humanity Award Dinner at the Waldorf Astoria Hotel on May 20, 2007. Winfrey was honored with the Humanitarian Award for “positively impacting people all over the world, especially children.” One year earlier, she had selected Wiesel’s “Night” for her popular book club “pick” which sent it immediately to the top of the national bestseller lists.

As for Wiesel and Borchardt, they answered questions about differences in the text of the new edition by saying they were not significant enough to justify raising questions. The next day, Wiesel’s wife Marion, the translator of the new edition of Night, said in an interview that among the changes was a reference to the age of the book’s narrator when he arrives in 1944 at Birkenau, the entry point for Auschwitz.

“At no point did this change the meaning and the fact of anything in the book,” Marion Wiesel said. She explained it this way: The narrator tells a fellow prisoner that he is “not quite 15.” But the scene takes place in Spring 1944. Mr. Wiesel, born on Sept. 30, 1928, would have already been 15, going on 16. So in the new edition, she changed it to “15.” Whaaaa? She changed the age as it was written in the Yiddish to fit Elie Wiesel, who was fifteen and a half at that time and would not have written “not quite 15.” What is written in the Yiddish original, Un di velt hot geshvign, we also find in the original Night. I will add that if your birthday is still four months away, you don’t say you are “not quite” your next age, especially when you are young. Marion tried to joke it away, telling reporters “I kidded Elie and told him, ‘I don’t think you can add.’”

But that particular change, rather than insignificant, was one of the major reasons that a new translation was undertaken. There are other quite significant changes in the new edition that will be enumerated in this article. When you learn what they are, you can decide for yourself if you think they are insignificant.

Right: Marion Wiesel is the translator of the 2006 edition of Night. Here, in 2010, she attends an after party at The Monkey Bar for Oliver Stone’s new “South of the Border” New York premiere at Cinema 21.

Wiesel wrote a Preface to the New Translation, something he didn’t have in the original La Nuit or Night.

In his preface, Wiesel begins: “Why did I write it? … so as not to go mad or, on the contrary, to go mad in order to understand the nature of madness …”

He continues in this vein—typical Wiesel mystical-religious style. However, in his only description of the writing process of this book—the typing of the 862 pages which he titled Un di velt hot geshvign, according to his later memoir—it is hard to believe that he was in such a state of mind. He writes in All Rivers Run to the Sea that during this time in Paris he is busy with his newspaper job and contacts; also involved in a love affair with a woman named Hanna. He embarks on a major journalistic assignment in Brazil, sent by his editor, taking along a friend to keep him company on the ship’s crossing. They both get free tickets from a “resourceful Israeli friend”—these benefactors are usually unnamed. As the voyage begins, he says his mind is dwelling on Hanna and whether he should take the marriage step that she had asked for.

I can’t imagine an atmosphere less conducive to writing about what he describes as “the immense, terrifying madness that had erupted in history.” But he continues very matter-of-factly in All Rivers, “During the crossing I wrote my testimony …” and in one short paragraph tells us all he thought important to say about it. Moreover, he has never elaborated on it since!

In the new preface, Wiesel writes that in retrospect he doesn’t know what he wanted to achieve with his words, but then he comes up with something: “I knew that I must bear witness. I also knew that, while I had many things to say, I did not have the words to say them.” He needed to “invent a new language.” He is not speaking of an actual language, like German, French or English—but a language of survivors, or for survivors. Wiesel writes that common words like “hunger—thirst—fear—transport—selection—fire—chimney … all have intrinsic meaning, but in those times, they meant something else.” Really? He does not explain how that is so. But Wiesel has tried to create the idea of holocaust survivors as a special class, set apart, who know things others do not know, and can never understand—”Only those who experienced Auschwitz know what it was. Others will never know.”

Wiesel describes his writing as slow! “Writing in my mother tongue (Yiddish) … I would pause at every sentence, and start over and over again. I would conjure up other verbs, other images, other silent cries. It still was not right.” This contrasts totally with his description in his memoir All Rivers Run to the Sea (p. 238-40) that he wrote the original Yiddish manuscript fast and feverishly without re-reading!

Why a new translation of Night after 45 years of success with the old one?

Here again, Wiesel hedges in the preface and doesn’t have a convincing answer. He says his wife Marion has translated other books for him, and “knows his voice better than anyone else.” He says he didn’t pay enough attention to the original English translation by Stella Rodway—after his first reading of Night from the publisher, he never read it again. As for Mrs. Wiesel: “Fluent in French, she had never read the English version,” she said. But good news! Elie Wiesel Cons The World has found a translator and now has large portions of the Yiddish book translated into English. We can compare the real 245-page original to both the 1960 English translation from the French by Stella Rodway and the 2006 English translation done by Marion Wiesel.

In doing so, we have made two important discoveries.

First, Stella Rodway’s 1960 English translation of Night is an accurate rendition of the French text of La Nuit, as originally published in 1958. That means that if there are any “errors” in the Night story, they weren’t put there by Stella Rodway.

Second, when we compare the three texts—the original version of Night, as translated by Rodway, the “corrected” 2006 translation by Marion Wiesel, and the 1955 Yiddish original of Un di velt hot geshvign—we find that the “errors” brought up by Marion Wiesel are for the greater part what was actually written in the original Yiddish book, though usually in more detail there.

In other words, the 1955 Yiddish version, the 1958 French version, and the 1960 English version generally agree—only the “corrected” 2006 translation is different. So, are these really errors of translation that Marion Wiesel is fixing for us? Or are they not simply problems for Elie Wiesel? Under close scrutiny, the Elie Wiesel narrative has huge holes which bring up embarrassing questions, and this is what Marion Wiesel’s new translation was meant to head off.

Left: Original Night cover, 1960, features the title, while the author’s name is exceptionally small and insignificant. Francois Mauriac’s forward is featured. In 2006, the author becomes the “title,” i.e. the main selling point, and Mauriac is no longer mentioned, although his forward remains in the book.

A Comparison of the 1960 original with the 2006 new version.

Following are the most “significant” differences I have found between the Stella Rodway 1960 translation and the Marion Wiesel 2006 translation. To make as clear a case as possible, I begin with the Yiddish [UdV] and its French translation La Nuit [LN], followed by the Stella Rodway English translation [SR]. Finally, Marion Wiesel’s revised translation [MW]. The word or phrase being compared is in boldface. Number one has already been written about in When Did Elie Wiesel Arrive at Auschwitz?

1. The Saturday before Pentecost … or two weeks before?

UdV Page 22: Geshen iz dos Shbth far Shbw’wth. A friling-zun hot oysgegosn ir likht un varemkeyt iber der gorer velt un oykh iber geto … / It happened Saturday [Sabbath] before Shavuot. The springtime sun had spread its light and warmth over the whole world, and even over the ghetto. . . .

LN Page 29: Le samedi précédant la Pentecôte, sous un soleil printanier, les gens se promenaient insouciants à travers les rues grouillantes de monde / The Saturday preceding Pentecost …

SR Page 23: On the Saturday before Pentecost, in the Spring sunshine, people strolled carefree and unheeding, through the swarming streets.

MW Page 12: Some two weeks before Shavuot (Pentecost). A sunny spring day, people strolled seemingly carefree through the crowded streets.

The Yiddish, the French and the original English versions agree—it was the Saturday before the festival of Pentecost/Shavuot—but Marion Wiesel’s new edition sets that date back by two whole weeks. This is important because, as the story continues, it was later on the following day that the Jews of Sighet were forced to leave their homes in preparation for their eventual deportation: “The ghetto was to be liquidated entirely. We were to leave street by street, starting the following day.”

So Mrs.Wiesel was NOT correcting errors in the English translation, but changing the text to fit the reality of when the Hungarians from Sighet arrived at Birkenau. Pentecost was on Sunday, May 28, 1944. The “Saturday before Pentecost” is thus May 27. Some two weeks before is May 14.

Un di velt hot geshvign, La Nuit and the Rodway translation all have Eliezer’s family leaving on the final journey to Auschwitz around June 2nd, six days after Pentecost/Shavuot, which was a Friday. However, they also agree that “Saturday, the day of rest, was chosen for our expulsion.” So it’s necessary for us to add another day to the family’s stay in the small ghetto to make the chronology work. On Saturday, then, the Jews are marched to the synagogue and spend the night there; in the morning, Sunday June 4, they board the train: “The following morning [Sunday], we marched to the station, where a convoy of cattle wagons was waiting. [… ] We were on our way.” Four days and three nights on the train (according to the description in Night) makes their arrival date June 6, 1944, around midnight.

But this is not only long after the prisoner number A7713—which Elie Wiesel supposedly received at Auschwitz, and still (again, supposedly!) has tattooed on his left arm—had been given out, but also long after the last transport left from Sighet. Indeed, there were no transports from the town after May, according to official records.

Marion Wiesel did not mention this one to the reporters; nor did Elie speak of it in his preface to his wife’s translation. But it was discovered by our translator. Marion Wiesel’s arbitrary “correction” allows Eliezer’s family to leave on May 21 and to arrive by May 24 (just before midnight!) thus making it possible for Eliezer to receive the registration number A7713. This is a very significant change, probably the most significant in her entire new English translation.

An added note: This interesting passage is on page 27 of Un di velt, but is not included in the shorter French or English Night:

We had opportunities and possibilities to hide with regular goyim and with prominent personalities. Many non-Jews from the surrounding villages had begged us, that we would come to them. There were bunkers available for us in villages or in the mountains. But we had cast aside all proposals. Why? Quite simple: the calendar showed April 1944 and we, the Jews of Sighet, still knew nothing about Treblinka, Buchenwald and Auschwitz.

Now we have April as the general time of deportation! So according to the timeline we find in Un di velt, Eliezer and his family left Sighet some time in June, while the calendar on their wall still said April . . . and in the meantime, we know from official Auschwitz records that the deportations actually occured in the last two weeks of May. The person who wrote this knew nothing about the real deportation dates for the Sighet Jews.

2. Copulating on the train … or just caressing?

UdV Page 47: Tsulib der engshaft hobn a sakh instinktn zikh dervekt in kerper. Erotishe instinktn, un untern forhang fun der nakht hobn yungeleyt un froyen zikh gelozn bahersht durkh di oyfgereytste chwshym zeyere.

Ot der ershter rezultat fun umglik: erotishe freyheyt. Di shpanung fun di letste teg hot itst gezukht a veg vi oystsulodn zikh un der leychtster iz geven – an erotisher.

Di erotishe stsenes hobn nisht dervekt keyn protestn mtsd di eltere Yidn. Zey hobn farmakht oyern un oygn, zikh gemakht nisht zen un nisht hern. In moment fun schnh faln avek di keytn fun der konventsioneler moral. Mentshn hobn zikh getrakht: ver veys vos der morgn iz “lwl tsu brengen? Zol yugnt oysnutsn dem heynt, oystsapn fun im dem letstn hn’h-tropn . . .

In English: Because of the crowding, a host of instincts awoke in [people’s] bodies. Erotic instincts – and beneath the curtain of night young men and women let themselves be ruled by their aroused senses.

And so the first result of misfortune: erotic freedom. The stress of the last days now sought a way to discharge itself, and the easiest was – an erotic one.

The erotic scenes did not arouse any protests from the older Jews. They closed their ears and eyes, and forced themselves not to see and hear. In the moment of danger, the chains of conventional morality fall away. People thought to themselves: who knows what the morning is likely to bring? Youth must seize the day, squeeze from it the last drops of pleasure . . .

LN Page 45: Libérés de toute censure sociale, les jeunes se laissaient aller ouvertement à leurs instincts et à la faveur de la nuit, s’accouplaient au milieu de nous, sans se préoccuper de qui que ce fût, seuls dans le monde. Les autres faisaient semblant de ne rien voir.

SR Page 34: “Free from all social constraint, the young people gave way openly to instinct, taking advantage of the darkness to copulate in our midst, without caring about anyone else, as though they were alone in the world. The rest pretended not to notice anything.”

MW Page 23: “Freed of normal constraints, some of the young let go of their inhibitions and, under cover of darkness, caressed one another, without any thought of others, alone in the world. The others pretended not to notice.”

Elie Wiesel did not mention this change in his preface to the new English translation by his wife, but he did give quite a lengthy explanation (humorous to us) in the preface he wrote for the new French edition. This is what he said there:

Thanks to her, it was possible for me to correct an incorrect expression or impression here and there. An example: I describe the first night-time voyage in the sealed cars, and I mention that certain persons had taken advantage of the darkness to commit sexual acts. That’s false. In the Yiddish text, I say that “young boys and girls allowed themselves to be mastered by their excited erotic instincts.” I have checked among many absolutely trustworthy sources. In the train, all the families were still together. A few weeks of the ghetto could not have degraded our behavior to the point of violating customs, mores and ancient laws. That there may have been some clumsy touching, that is possible. But that was all. Nothing went any further. But then, why did I say that in Yiddish, and allow it to be translated into French and English? The only possible explanation: it is myself I am speaking of. It is myself that I condemn. I imagine that the adolescent that I was then, in the throes of puberty even if profoundly pious, could not resist such erotic imaginings, enriched by the physical proximity between men and women.

The original French : Grâce à elle, il me fut permis de corriger çà et là une expression ou une impression erronées. Exemple : j’évoque le premier voyage nocturne dans les wagons plombés et je mentionne que certaines personnes avaient profité de l’obscurité pour commettre des actes sexuels. C’est faux. Dans le texte yiddish je dis que « des jeunes garçons et filles se sont laissés maîtriser par leurs instincts érotiques excités. » J’ai vérifié auprès de plusieurs sources absolument sûres. Dans le train toutes les familles étaient encore réunies. Quelques semaines de ghetto n’ont pas pu dégrader notre comportement au point de violer coutumes, moeurs et lois anciennes. Qu’il y ait eu des attouchements maladroits, c’est possible. Ce fut tout. Nul n’est allé plus loin. Mais alors, pourquoi l’ai-je dit en yiddish et permis de le traduire en français et en anglais? La seule explication possible: c’est de moi-même que je parle. C’est moi-même que je condamne. J’imagine que l’adolescent que j’étais, en pleine puberté bien que profondément pieux, ne pouvait résister à l’imaginaire érotique enrichi par la proximité physique entre hommes et femmes.

Is this convincing, dear readers? Consider that the narrator of Un di velt says exactly the opposite of what Wiesel tries to present in his new French preface: the first result of a few weeks in the ghetto was erotic freedom, which was acted out in front of everyone in the train. And the “erotic instincts” that the youths let themselves be “ruled by” clearly must have involved sexual intercourse—why else would everyone have needed to shut their eyes and ears so tightly?

The Elie Wiesel of 2006 (and perhaps the Hasidic rebbes had something to do with this?) wants us to believe in the inviolable sanctity of the Jews’ “customs, mores and ancient laws,” and also in their innate respect for their elders and one another, but he is directly contradicted by what are, we are told, his own words of fifty years ago : “In the moment of danger, the chains of conventional morality fall away.” Which Wiesel do we believe?

And Ruth Franklin (right), senior editor at The New Republic, has the temerity to insist (in her 2006 review article) that “his [Elie’s] original suggestion that couples “copulated” in the cattle cars on the way to Auschwitz . . . was always a gross mistranslation of the original Yiddish.” We’ve shown you here that it isn’t.

3. Not yet fifteen … or fifteen?

UdV Page 63 : Yingl, vi alt bistu? fregt mir a heftling. Zeyn pnym iz geven in der fintster, ober zeyn kol iz geven a mids, a varems. Nokh nisht keyn 15 yor, hob ikh geentfert.

“Kid, how old are you?” a prisoner asked me. His face was in darkness, but his voice was tired and warm. “Not yet 15 years,” I answered.

LN Page 54: Hé, le gosse, quel âge as-tu? C’était un détenu qui m’interrogeait. Je ne voyais pas son visage, mais sa voix était lasse et chaude. “Pas encore quinze ans.” / Not yet 15 years.

SR Page 39: “Here, kid, how old are you?” It was one of the prisoners who asked me this. I could not see his face, but his voice was tense and weary. “I’m not quite fifteen yet.”

MW Page 30: “Hey, kid, how old are you?” The man interrogating me was an inmate. I could not see his face, but his voice was weary and warm. “Fifteen”

This very important passage was discussed above. I think the reader would agree that “not yet 15″ can mean even farther from the age of 15 than “not quite fifteen.” It can mean 14 ½. However, it is a minor point that I will not emphasize. What we can clearly see is that Marion Wiesel has changed the author’s original words to fit them to her husband’s age in Spring 1944.

4. April … or May?

UdV Page 83: A sheyner April-tog iz es geven. A frilings-rich in der luft. In English: It was a beautiful April day. A scent of spring in the air.

LN Page 69: C’était une belle journee d’avril. Des parfums de printemps flottaient dans l’air. Le soleil baissait vers l’ouest.

SR Page 49: It was a beautiful April day. The fragrance of spring was in the air. The sun was setting in the west.

MW Page 40: It was a beautiful day in May. The fragrances of spring were in the air. The sun was setting.

(See again When Did Wiesel Arrive) Once more, the original Night as translated by Stella Rodway agrees with the Yiddish and the French; Marion Wiesel arbitrarily changed April to May, yet said her translation did not “change the meaning or the fact of anything in the book” … what she calls a “significant change.” Well, this is a significant change, and for the same reason as given in number 1 above.

5. Himmler … or “Reichsfuehrer Himmler?”

UdV Page 124-5: “In nomen fun Himler . . . der heftling num’ . . . hot gegnbet . . . bsh”thn luft-alarm . . . loytn gezets, paragraf . . . iz der heftling num’ . . . farurteylt tsum toyt! Zol dos zeyn a lere un a beyshpil far ale heftlingen . . .”

“In the name of Himmler . . . prisoner number . . . stole . . . during the air raid . . . according to the law, paragraph . . . prisoner number . . . is condemned to death. May this be a lesson and an example for all prisoners.”

LN Page 100: “Au nom de Himmler ... Le détenu N^o… a dérobé pendant l’alerte… ”

SR Page 68: “In the name of Himmler … prisoner Number … stole during the alert … According to the law … paragraph …prisoner Number … is condemned to death. May this be a warning and an example to all prisoners.”

MW Page 62: “In the name of Reichsfuehrer Himmler … prisoner number … stole during the air raid … according to the law … prisoner number … is condemned to death. Let this be a warning …..”

Again, the Yiddish and the original Night agree. However, no trained member of the SS, or even the Wehrmacht, would ever have shown such disrespect as to use Himmler’s name in such a formal context without his full title: Reichsfuehrer SS Heinrich Himmler. Marion Wiesel tried to fix the error by adding “Reichsfuehrer,” but she still gets it wrong: you don’t drop the “SS.” On its own, this tells us that the speech was an imaginary one invented by the author (whoever that is), someone who was never present at such a scene. Indeed, lack of knowledge about how the SS functioned in the camps is evident throughout the book. For example, the SS did not normally go inside the barracks; everything inside was handled by the kapos.

Left: Reichsfuehrer SS Heinrich Himmler

6. Ten days and ten nights … or just “days and nights”

UdV Page 207: Tsen teg un tsen nekht hot gedoyert di reyze. / Ten days and ten nights the trip lasted.

LN Page 155: Dix jours, dix nuits de voyage. Il nous arrivait de traverser des localités allemandes.

SR Page101: Ten days, ten nights of traveling. Sometimes we would pass through German townships.

MW Page 100: There followed days and nights of traveling. Occasionally we would pass through German towns.

In January of 1945, as the advancing Red Army approached Auschwitz, a decision was made to evacuate, sending the prisoners to other camps in Germany. Evacuation of the Monowitz (Auschwitz III) camp, to which Eliezer and Father had previously been transferred, began at 6 p.m. on January 18. The prisoners were given extra clothing and food—bread to carry with them. They also had whatever food they had saved up. After marching all night during a snowfall, they rested in the morning in an old brick factory. In late afternoon, they began again and reached Gleiwitz camp in a few hours [night, Jan. 19]; they then remained in Gleiwitz barracks for three days. On the 22nd they went to the train stop and waited until evening. They were brought bread for the journey. The convoy set out

From there, as we see above, the Yiddish, the 1958 French and 1960 English versions agree on the trip lasting ten days and nights. But Marion Wiesel removes the number ten because it makes Eliezer’s timeline for the death of his father on Jan. 28/29 completely impossible. Another very significant change. Ten days and nights from the night of Jan. 22nd is the night of Feb 1, 1945.

This shows that the author of Un di velt knew nothing about the transport that arrived at Buchenwald on January 26 with 3000 prisoners from Auschwitz. This is the transport that, according to existing official records, brought Lazar and Abraham Wiesel to Buchenwald, who were registered at the camp there on . . . January 26, 1945! (See Buchenwald Archivist Cannot ID Elie Wiesel, How True to Life is Wiesel’s description of Buchenwald, and Gigantic Fraud Carried Out.)

7. Fifteen … or sixteen?

UdV Page 213: I was fifteen years old then. Do you understand—fifteen? Is it any wonder that I, along with my generation, do not believe either in God or in man; in the feelings of a son, in the love of a father. Is it any Wonder that I cannot realize that I myself experienced this thing, that my childish eyes had witnessed it? (This passage from Moshe Spiegel’s stand-alone translation of Chapter Six of Un di velt hot geshvign, published as “The Death Train” in the 1968 volume Anthology of Holocaust Literature.)

LN Page 158: J’avais quinze ans. / I was fifteen.

SR Page 103: I was fifteen years old.

MW Page 102: I was sixteen.

In the original versions, Eliezer repeats that he is fifteen years old in January 1945. Elie Wiesel’s birth date is Sept. 30, 1928 so on that day in 1944 he became sixteen years old, making him 16 years and 4 months when this particular event on the train to Buchenwald occurred in late January 1945. Once again, Marion Wiesel simply changes the age as she did before – if Elie was actually sixteen at that time, then Eliezer, the character in the book, must be too!

In Part Two, I will construct the timeline of the events in Buchenwald following the arrival of Eliezer and his father, and other details about Buchenwald. What will we find out? Stay tuned.

Endnotes:

1. On the back cover of the original hardcover Night, with the black & white striped jacket (as pictured here), it is printed “Literature” as the classification.

2. Ruth Franklin, A Thousand Darknesses: Lies and Truth in Holocaust Fiction, Oxford University Press, 2011, pp 71-72.

Unfortunately, Night is an imperfect ambassador for the infallibility of the memoir, owing to the fact that it has been treated very often as a novel—by journalists, by scholars, and even by its publishers. Lawrence Langer, in his landmark study The Holocaust and the Literary Imagination, notes that Night “continues to be classified and critically acclaimed as a novel, and not without reason.” . . .

Nonetheless, in 1997 Publishers Weekly columnist Paul Nathan had to issue a correction apologizing for referring to the book as an “autobiographical novel”; he had been misled, he said, by the entry on Wiesel in The International Dictionary of Twentieth-Century Biography. In response, the correction itself was challenged by the director of Penguin Reference Books, publishers of the biography dictionary, who cited half a dozen sources to the effect that Night was in fact a novel. Together with most critics, Gary Weissman, who recounted the above history in his book Fantasies of Witnessing: Postwar Efforts to Experience the Holocaust, seems to concur with Ernst Pawel’s remark in an early magazine survey of Holocaust fiction, that “the line between fact and fiction, tenuous at best, tends to vanish altogether in autobiographical novels such as Night.” The hybrid terms used to describe it include “novel/autobiography,” “non-fictional novel,” “semi-fictional memoir,” “fictional-autobiographical memoir,” “fictionalized autobiographical memoir,” and “memoir-novel.

The National Socialist government of Germany was neither the first nor the last to deal with health issues resulting from concentrating large populations in confined areas. It is unfortunately typical that many who consider the accounts of witnesses of the Nazi concentration camp system view this time and the events which have come to be known as the Holocaust as totally unique in history. It is both important and enlightening to consider the Nazi procedures to handle population transfers in light of similar procedures in the United States and other less-maligned countries.

I have recently discovered an important article that helps shed light on American delousing practices in the years running up to the Second World War. In a New York Times article, “New Delousing Plant” which was published on July 17, 1921, we learn that then governor of New York Miller was very concerned about the spread of Typhus coming from arriving immigrant populations. The article recounts Miller’s tour of Hoffman Island with several other state officials to view the delousing plant that was under construction there. Hoffman Island, largely forgotten today, is a small island in Lower New York Bay that was used in the early 1900’s as a quarantine station for immigrants found to be carrying diseases when they arrived at the more well-known Ellis Island.

The article describes the need to combat the panic that was developing in the native populations when newly arriving immigrants from southern Europe were found to be infected with Typhus. The Health Commissioner of New York is described as having the “rather terrible responsibility of protecting the entire nation against typhus.” The article goes on to report that the Surgeon General said, “the station is sadly lacking in facilities to meet the present emergency, and it is most important that the sanitary safeguards at that port be strengthened if the infection be excluded and at the same time commerce be not obstructed.”

The Surgeon General communicated directly with Governor Miller who directed state architect Lewis Pilcher to expedite the work on whatever facilities were necessary at the quarantine station to halt the typhus invasion. Miller authorized that any reasonable amount of state funds could be spent to build a delousing plant on Hoffman Island. Pilcher’s plans were approved by authorities from the Public Health Service. We learn also that Pilcher’s design was not limited to the New York area and that the Royal government of Italy was adopting the plans for its own quarantine station for emigrants.

The delousing plant is described as follows:

“The most noticeable features of the building are the complete elimination of all trim, which makes it impossible for vermin to lodge anywhere. Floors, when completed, will be made entirely of concrete, sloping to a central drain so as to permit flushing with salt water.”

The delousing process which was to be used is also described.

“The immigrants who are to go through the process of delousing enter a room capable of accommodating groups of seventy-five to one hundred at a time. They are asked to remove their clothes. Their shoes, leather belts and similar articles are placed in one room, where they are treated with gasoline and oil, and their other clothing put in burlap bags, one to each individual. The bags are numbered and each person receives a tag. The bags full of clothing are put through two chambers, where they are treated with cyanide gas, which does not destroy them, or with steam under pressure. These treatments penetrate the materials and destroy both the lice and the nits.

Immigrants then pass into a series of shower baths where they are treated with a certain mixture of soap and oil or acetic acid, of which the principle is that the vermin are suffocated. The men’s hair is cut off and the women’s hair is thoroughly treated with oil. When the treatment is finished their clothes are restored to the immigrants, each in an individual bag.”

This process is described as one that is calculated to maintain “thoroughness and efficiency.” With this process immigrants are said to be processed at a rate of 100 per hour.

There can be no doubt that like the New York war on typhus that the Nazi government built delousing stations and utilized procedures to fight typhus in the concentration camp population. In fact, all arriving prisoners in the Nazi concentration camp system must have been subjected to a process not unlike that on Hoffman Island.

Holocaust witness, Primo Levi describes just such a process in his Survival in Auschwitz. Levi who was an inmate at Monowitz (sometimes referred to as Auschwitz III) describes the disinfection process as follows:

“Unexpectedly the water gushes out boiling from the showers – five minutes of bliss; but immediately after, four men (perhaps they are the barbers) burst in yelling and shoving and drive us out, wet and steaming, into the adjoining room which is freezing; here other shouting people throw at us unrecognizable rags and thrust into our hands a pair of broken-down boots with wooden soles; we have no time to understand and we already find ourselves in the open, in the blue and icy snow of dawn, barefoot and naked, with all our clothing in our hands, with a hundred yards to run to the next hut. There we are finally allowed to get dressed.”

Not unlike the immigrants arriving at the delousing plant of Hoffman Island, Primo Levi and those like him, arriving at Auschwitz were stripped naked, given soap, sent to hot showers while their clothing was deloused with cyanide gas. The rooms had drains in the floor for the excess water to flow. Rather than being given their recently deloused clothing back, the inmates of Auschwitz and other camps were given the striped garb of the concentration camp prisoner.

The process was designed to be thorough and efficient. The fear, confusion and psychological impact which would later result in fantastic macabre tales in which the cleansing soap became the fat of former victims and the life-preserving delousing agent became an instrument of death could not have been predicted by German officials who were under strict orders to lower the mortality rate attributed to typhus.

Sources:

“New Delousing Plant,” New York Times, July 17, 1921.

Primo Levi, Survival In Auschwitz. Collier Books, New York, 1961.

This article originally appeared in Smith’s Report Number 165, September, 2009.

By Thomas Kues

In November 2010 I published a blog entry on an online video concerning the research activity of a young British archaeologist from the University of Birmingham, Caroline Sturdy Colls, who had set out to refute “Holocaust Deniers” by locating the mass graves at the Treblinka “extermination camp” using “the most up-to-date scientific techniques”.[1] Recently, a news report was published boldly stating that “mass graves at Nazi death camp Treblinka prove Holocaust deniers wrong”. In this we read that

“A British forensic archaeologist has unearthed fresh evidence to prove the existence of mass graves at the Nazi death camp Treblinka. Some 800,000 Jews were killed at the site, in north east Poland, during the Second World War but a lack of physical evidence at the site has been exploited by Holocaust deniers. Forensic archaeologist Caroline Sturdy Colls has now undertaken the first co-ordinated scientific attempt to locate the graves.”[2]

It is worth recalling that the same triumphatory claim that the “Holocaust deniers” finally and once and for all had been “refuted” was heard in connection with Kola’s surveys at Belzec and Sobibór, which in reality turned out to refute the official version of events relating to these two camps.

The above quoted news item was more or less a push for a radio program, “Hidden Graves of the Holocaust”, featuring Sturdy Colls as well as Yitzhak Arad and former Treblinka inmate Kalman Taigman, which was broadcast by BBC Radio 4 on 23 January 2012, 20:00 GMT.[3] In anticipation of this radio program, on the same date, a podcast interview was uploaded by the University of Birmingham “Ideas Lab”.[4] In this we can listen to the following description of the methods employed by Sturdy Colls and her team, as well as some vague descriptions of their findings:

“Interviewer: What technology have you used to investigate the site?

 Sturdy Colls: I used a number of non-invasive techniques at Treblinka and what this means is, as you quite rightly pointed out, the ground wasn’t disturbed due to Jewish burial law so the methods used didn’t involve any form of ground disturbance or excavation and this allowed us to investigate the historic and scientific potential of Treblinka but obviously it was very important that we recognised its religious and commemorative significance as well. So the techniques that were used, there was a process of archival research which involved looking at documentary records, revisiting historical data if you like, looking at known data and assessing it with an archaeological eye, so looking for information about the landscape. Then there was a process of looking for aerial photographs of the site, any ground based photography, accounts by the witnesses, plans that had been created, etc, to build up a database of information so that when I did do the survey all of that could be corroborated against my results. So in the field this involved field walking, so assessing the landscape, topographic survey which used advanced GPS and total station surveying to demarcate features on a plan of the site allowed us to record micro-topographic change which may be indicative of buried features. And also to assess the visibility of other features such as a number of artefacts that were actually identified in quite a remote part of the site. Then moving on from that to look below the ground I used a number of geophysical techniques, so quite often mentioned is ground penetrating radar and this was one of the methods used but this was also corroborated with other methods that detect other physical properties in the soil. So I also used resistance survey and an extension of that which allows 3D imaging of buried remains as well, to ensure that all of the properties of the buried remains could be characterised accurately.

 Interviewer: And what have you discovered?

 Sturdy Colls: Well the survey results when corroborated with historical information have indicated that there are a number of surviving building foundations at Treblinka just below the surface and also a considerable amount of obviously structural debris which the Nazis would have been simply unable to have removed from the site, and this supports accounts written by post-war investigators which commented upon the visibility of artefactual remains, structural remains, at the camp. We’ve also identified a number of pits at the site. Again, all these pits have been mapped and corroborated with witness plans and this is indicative of a number of probable graves at the site. It is recognised as part of the survey that the history of Treblinka didn’t end with its abandonment by the Nazis. Issues such as post-war looting and the construction of the memorial itself and a number of other forms of landscape change that have taken place at the site, you know, could confuse interpretation so it was essential that all of these were considered when the results from the geophysical survey in particular were being assessed. So then all of this data was married up with historical information so we seem to have a situation here where it’s been commonly believed that all of the victims at Treblinka were cremated, they were destroyed without trace, however, the research has revealed a much more complex picture of the disposal patterns used by the Nazis. Looking at it from an offender profiling perspective, so a slightly more forensic point of view, the Nazis worked on, as do most offenders, this principle of least effort where they would actually have a burial method that very much matched the nature of their victims or their locations within the camp and there are a number of photographs and physical evidence that we observed on the ground at Treblinka that demonstrates that these bodies were not reduced to ash, that some survive as mass graves in the truest sense and that also the ashes of the victims were redeposited into the pits that they were originally exhumed from upon Himmler’s order in 1943. Also with the topographic survey we’ve demonstrated that the camp as it’s marked currently on the ground by the modern memorial was actually much larger, that the boundaries of the camp should have been 50 metres further north and this has a knock-on effect for a number of structures within the camp itself. So we can examine it from a spatial point of view and look at all of these features in relation to each other and hopefully eventually start to build up a more detailed map of the camp as it existed during its operation.

 Interviewer: So you’ve now presented your findings to the authorities responsible for the memorial at Treblinka. Does this conclude investigations at the Treblinka site or is it sort of an ongoing project?

 Sturdy Colls: It’s absolutely an ongoing project. The survey demonstrated that the site has got huge potential in terms of what we can learn from the application of archaeological method and very much was the tip of the iceberg in terms of being the first survey of what I hope will be many more to come. I hope to return to the site later on this year and there will be subsequent seasons of fieldwork in coming years. As I mentioned, at the moment what we’ve got is a map of what survived at the camp as a result of my findings. However, in order to build up a map of the camp as it existed we need to do more work, we need to survey the site. Only a small proportion of the site has actually been surveyed so there’s huge potential to find out more about the history of this camp in the future.”

Somewhat more on the findings of Sturdy-Coll could be gleaned from the BBC 4 radio documentary “Hidden Graves of the Holocaust”. Starting at the mark 23:20 minutes we hear:

“Caroline Sturdy Colls: All the history books states that Treblinka was destroyed by the Nazis, in summary, the survey demonstrated that this simply isn’t the case. I have identified a number of buried [sic] pits using geophysical techniques. These are considerable. One in particular is 26 meters by 17 meters.

 Jonathan Charles: That’s huge.

 Sturdy Colls: It is huge. We are talking about a considerable number of bodies [which] could have been contained within pits of that size.

 Charles: That could have contained hundreds, perhaps thousands of bodies, we don’t know deep it is, or do you know how deep it is?

 Sturdy Colls: Unfortunately no. The survey technology does not allow us to go to certain depths. I know that it is over 4 meters, that was the extent of this [inaudible]. It’s a considerable pit.

 Charles: There are quite a few pits that you have discovered?

 Sturdy Colls: Absolutely, there were a number of pits, in particular to the rear of what of what is now the current memorial, five that are actually in a row, again of a considerable size, in an area where witnesses state this was the main body disposal area, this is behind the gas chambers, it was where the majority of victims who were sent there were then subsequently buried, and later where the cremative remains of the victims were also placed.

 Charles: It’s not just pits that you found, there’s also what look like buildings.

 Sturdy Colls: There are, and again, the Nazis claimed they destroyed Treblinka, they certainly levelled the site, but it’s not really possible when buildings have been on a site to actually sterilize the ground, so what I’ve identified is that solid structural remains, we’re talking building foundations, do survive, but in particular two sort of structures that I’ve identified are likely to be the old and new gas chambers at Treblinka.”

While here we learn virtually nothing about the supposed remains of the Treblinka “gas chambers” we are provided with some tantalizing information on the camp’s burial pits. Needless to say, a critical assessment of the findings made by Sturdy Colls can only be made after she has published at least a preliminary report or a detailed article on the same, but we may nonetheless with appropriate caution note down some preliminary observations on what has been revealed so far. The most interesting information, however, is not to be found in the radio interviews, but in a short article by Sturdy Colls herself which was published on the website of the BBC on 23 January.[5] In this we read:

“The existence of mass graves was known about from witness testimony, but the failure to provide persuasive physical evidence led some to question whether it could really be true that hundreds of thousands of Jews were killed here.

 Although they lasted only a few days, those post-war investigations [in 1945-1946] remained the most complete studies of the camp until I began my work at Treblinka in 2010.

 This revealed the existence of a number of pits across the site.

 Some may be the result of post-war looting, prompted by myths of buried Jewish gold, but several larger pits were recorded in areas suggested by witnesses as the locations of mass graves and cremation sites.

 One is 26m long, 17m wide and at least four metres deep, with a ramp at the west end and a vertical edge to the east.

 Another five pits of varying sizes and also at least this deep are located nearby. Given their size and location, there is a strong case for arguing that they represent burial areas.

 [...].

 As well as the pits, the survey has located features that appear to be structural, and two of these are likely to be the remains of the gas chambers.

According to witnesses, these were the only structures in the death camp made of brick.”

Even more importantly, this article is illustrated with two composite maps on which the outlines of the findings made by Sturdy Colls have been superimposed on a modern-day aerial photograph of the former camp site and a 1944 aerial photograph of the same area respectively. In the figure below I have placed these two composite maps side by side, moved the main legend and the scale and slightly increased the picture size in order to allow for easier comparison of scale. On the map to the left I have also arbitrarily numbered the “probable burial/cremation pits” from 1 to 10 (click on the picture to view it in full size).

The information furnished by the two interviews, the article and the maps allow us to make the following observations:

1) The pit which Sturdy Colls mentions “in particular” and which is stated to have a surface area of “26 meters by 17 meters”, that is a total of 442 square meters, is, judging by the dimensions, most likely identical with the rather irregular pit #3, located some 25 m south of the large cenotaph. This is clearly the largest in surface of the 10 pits identified.

2) As far as the surface area is concerned, 2 of the 33 mass graves identified by Andrzej Kola at Belzec (pits #1 and 27) were larger (with 480 and 540 square meters respectively), whereas 2 more (#7 and 14) were almost of the same size (364.5 and 370 square meters respectively).[6] Of the 6 burial pits identified by Kola at Sobibór 2 (pit #2 and 4) were larger or even significantly larger (with surface areas of 500 and 1,575 square meters respectively), whereas 2 other graves were nearly of the same surface size (pits #1 and 6, with 400 and 375 square meters respectively).[7] Yet whereas at Belzec some 435,000 and at Sobibór some 80,000 corpses are alleged to have been interred,[8] the number of uncremated bodies buried at Treblinka is supposed to have amounted to at least some 700,000. Would it then not make sense for the Germans to use mass graves of a larger size at Treblinka than at the other two Reinhardt camps?

3) The eyewitnesses Eliahu Rosenberg and Chil Rajchman, who to the knowledge of this author are the only witnesses to have provided detailed statements on the dimensions of the mass graves in the “death camp proper”, claim pits of sizes vastly larger than the largest pit mapped by Sturdy Colls. Eliahu Rosenberg claimed in 1947 that the mass graves measured 120 m × 15 m × 6 m, giving a surface area of 1,800 square meters and a total volume 9,900 cubic meters.[9] Chil Rajchman, whose 1944 testimony [10] is prominently featured in the “Hidden Graves of the Holocaust” radio program – including a particularly bizarre passage from it concerning burning blood – states:

“The pits were enormous, about 50 metres long, about 30 wide and several storeys deep. I estimate that the pits could contain about four storeys.”[11] 

The burial pits thus measured 1,500 square meters according to the witness Rajchman and maybe as much as (1,500 x 12 =) 18,000 cubic meters in volume! How come that the largest of the pits discovered by Sturdy Colls corresponds to less than one third of the surface size claimed by Rajchman and to one fourth of the surface area claimed by Rosenberg?

4) It is indeed unfortunate that the top modern equipment used by Study-Colls for some reason or other was not able to detect depths exceeding 4 meters. Perhaps it would have been wise of her to dispense of some of the piety with regards to “Jewish burial laws” and utilize probe drillings to measure the depth of the pits, as was done by Kola at both Belzec and Sobibór. Of the pits identified by Kola in these two camps, the deepest pit (#3 at Sobibór) measured 5.80 m, whereas the depth of the remaining pits averaged some 4 m.

Generously assuming Rosenberg’s estimate of 6 meters (Rajchman’s estimate of some 12 meters can be safely dismissed as an exaggeration), and even more generously assuming (for the sake of argument) 6 meters to be the effective depth, with the pit walls being vertical instead of sloping (an obviously unrealistic assumption, which is moreover contradicted by Sturdy Colls statement that this pit had a “ramp” at the west end and a “vertical edge to the east”, implying that three out of four side walls were oblique – but again, for the sake of argument…) pit #3 would have a volume of (26 x 17 x 6 =) 2,652 cubic meters. Assuming an average capacity of 8 corpses per cubic meters,[12] this means that the pit in question could have contained in total (2,652 x 8 =) 21,216 corpses. Since the so-called Höfle document from an exterminationist viewpoint shows that nearly 713,555 were murdered at Treblinka up until the end of 1942 – in reality this document only proves that this number of Jews was deported to the camp up until that time – and since virtually all sources maintain that non-experimental cremations on a significant scale did not commence at Treblinka until 1943, at least 700,000 corpses would have had to have been interred in the camp, necessitating no less than (700,000 / 21,216 =) 33 pits of the same size as pit #3, with a total surface area of 14,586 square meter, or nearly 1.5 hectares. Needless to say the mass graves would have had to be separated by soil walls of considerable thickness, thereby increasing the surface area required by the graves.

 
Above: Montage of the 10 identified pits placed within a square 100 x 100 meters. Relative dimensions have been kept unchanged from the maps produced by Caroline Sturdy Colls.

5) Pits #1 and 2, which together appear to have a surface area of some 600-700 square meters, are located in the western part of the camp site, near the torn-up railroad sidespur, clearly outside of the “death camp proper”. These may be identical with the mass graves mentioned by the witness Abraham Kszepicki, in which the bodies of Jews who had died en route to the camp were buried during the first months of operation.[13]

 6) The four pits #5-8 are placed in a (not very straight) row. Sturdy Colls states in the radio documentary that there are “five” pits of “considerable size” “in a row” and in the area which witnesses state “was the main body disposal area, (…) behind the gas chambers”. Either Sturdy Colls mistakenly said five when she meant four, or it may be that one of the pits, perhaps #6, with its “neck” in the middle, is counted by her as two separate pits. Regardless of which, it is clear that the pits #5-8 cover a surface area which corresponds to roughly 175-200 % that of #3, that is, somewhere in the range of 750-900 square meters.

 7) Altogether, pits #3-10 as mapped by Sturdy Colls cover a surface hardly exceeding 1,800 square meters. If again, for the sake of argument, we assume the no doubt overly generous average effective depth of 6 meters with vertical pit walls – and once more I want to remind my readers that the pits identified at Belzec and Sobibór averaged some 4 m in depth – this would mean that the “probable burial/cremation pits” in the “death camp proper”/”upper camp”/”camp 2″ [14] had a total volume of some (1,800 x 6 =) 10,800 cubic meters. The pits at Belzec as identified by Kola have a total estimated volume of 21,310 cubic meters,[15] whereas those at Sobibór have a total estimated volume of 14,718.75 cubic meters.[16] The no doubt greatly exaggerated estimate of 10,800 cubic meters could have contained at most some (10,800 x 8 =) 86,400 corpses (assuming instead a more realistic average effective depth of 5 m this figure would change to 72,000 – and this still disregards the likely enlargement of the original grave volumes due to clandestine diggings and other causes). According to Yitzhak Arad some 312,500 Jews were murdered in Treblinka merely “during the first five weeks of the killing operation”.[17] According to the files of the Jewish Council in Warsaw, 251,545 Jews from the ghetto in that city were deported to Treblinka between 22 July 1942 and 12 September 1942.[18] And as already mentioned, the Höfle document states that 713,555 were deported to Treblinka up until the end of 1942. Judging by the information revealed, only a small fraction of this enormous number of people could have been buried in the identified “probable burial/cremation pits”, even taking into account the two pits in the reception camp, which could not have been used for any hypothetical “gas chamber” victims given the reported structure of the camp.

 8 ) Sturdy Colls’s statement that “the failure to provide persuasive physical evidence [of mass graves] led some to question whether it could really be true that hundreds of thousands of Jews were killed here” implies that the presence of mass graves itself would be enough to refute the “deniers”. However, it is clear that mass graves of considerable size must have existed at Treblinka, even if it was in fact only a transit camp. Holocaust historian Dieter Pohl estimates that up to 5 % of the deportees to the Reinhardt camps perished en route due to suffocation, dehydration, crushing caused by panicking deportees etc.[19] Considering that the reception of transports at Treblinka during the intense initial months of operation is claimed to have been grossly mismanaged by the first camp commandant, Dr. Irmfried Eberl (who, apparently because of this reason, was fired and replaced by Franz Stangl), leading to the delay of transports at way stations [20] – and this in the summer heat of July and August – there is little reason to doubt this estimate with regard to Treblinka. Since some 800,000 Jews in total were deported to Treblinka during the camp’s period of operation (July 1942 – August 1943), this would mean a total of some 40,000 en route deaths. Moreover, there are reasons to assume that a smaller percentage of the deportees were subjected to “euthanasia” due to contageous or mental diseases, or for being too weak for further transport. To this should be added a smaller number of deaths among the camp inmates caused by epidemics etc, as well as those killed by guards in connection with attempts at escape or uprisings.

 9) The vague mention of a “more complex picture of the disposal patterns used by the Nazis” is interesting. Were uncremated corpses also detected by the survey, and if so, how many?

 10) Sturdy Colls label the pits “probable burial/cremation pits”, indicating that one or more of the pits may have been used for cremations and not for interment (at Sobibór Kola identified such a pit with an area of 10 x 3 m and a depth of up to 90 cm). In this context the smaller, more rectangular pits #4 and 5 may be the most likely candidates. The dimensions of an identified cremation pit could give important hints about the actual cremation capacity at Treblinka.

 11) It is noteworthy that none of the pits or structural remains are located under the stone/concrete covered memorial areas (cf. the map to the left, where these areas are visible as a bluish gray). Sturdy Colls’s statements does not mention whether or not she was able to map these area with her geophysics equipment.[21] This issue, like many others, will have to await further clarification. The covered area inside the “death camp proper” appears to correspond to roughly 1 hectare.

 12) It may be worth making a quick comparison of the maps of Study-Colls with the “reconstruction” of Treblinka proposed by exterminationist air-photo analyst Alex Bay.[22] Concerning the mass graves Bay writes:

“Unfortunately, the aerial photography does not contain enough information to delineate the boundaries of the graves. The May [1944] coverage is sufficient only for crudely identifying the places where deep disturbances in general are probable, but the exact boundaries cannot be established.

In Figure 42 aerial photography is presented in which nine 50 by 25 meter [164 x 82 feet] pits have been drawn to scale along the east and west sides. The positioning and size of these pits is purely speculative.”[23]

The dimensions of 50 x 25 m for the pits are taken from Bay’s number one eyewitness, Yankiel Wiernik, and his 1944 publication A Year in Treblinka. Wiernik writes indeed that “The dimensions of each ditch were 50 by 25 by 10 meters”[24] but this almost certainly refer to ditches located not in the “death camp proper”, but in the reception camp. The scene wherein Wiernik provides the abovementioned dimensions takes place on the second day after his arrival in the camp, and the following chapters imply that first visited the “death camp proper” or Camp II, as he calls it, only several days later.

In the figure below I have placed Bay’s Figure 42 side by side with the Sturdy Colls composite map based on the 1944 air photo. The scales of the two maps have been harmonized. To Bay’s map I have also added the letters A and B to indicate the solid black outlines drawn by Bay to mark out the two alleged gas chamber buildings. Even considering Bay’s admittal that the positioning and size of his mass graves “is purely speculative” it is clear that his vision of what the “death camp proper” might have looked like differ considerably from the Sturdy Colls map. As for the locations of the two alleged gas chamber buildings, which Bay goes to painstaking length to identify, based on the aerial photos and witness statements, the 4 structures marked out by Sturdy Colls (in blue) and designated “probable location of gas chambers” are located some 100 m south of the sites pinpointed by Bay. The alignment of these structures is also rather different from that asserted by Bay. Together with the considerable difference in surface size between the mass graves posited by Bay and the pits identified by Sturdy Colls, this says something of the competence of Bay as well as the reliability of his star witness Wiernik.   

 Above: Bay’s “reconstruction” of Treblinka compared with the 1944 air photo version of the Sturdy Colls map (click to enlarge)

13) As for the “probable location of gas chambers” we learn virtually nothing other than that Sturdy Colls has identified two brick structures. On the composite maps, however, four structures are marked out, of which the largest (near the eastern exit of the “Road to heaven”) is likely to be the one identified by Sturdy Colls as the “new gas chamber building”. The three other structures, two of which are relatively large, are located close to each other. One must suppose that one of the two larger structures has been identified by Sturdy Colls as the “old gas chamber building”. According to the most elaborate exterminationist effort to map Treblinka based on aerial photos and eyewitness testimony (and in this case one of the ground photos from the Kurt Franz “Schoene Zeiten” album interpreted by Bay and others as taken inside the “death camp proper”), the 2004 map of Peter Laponder,[25] the only structures located adjacent to the “old gas chamber building” were a water pump shelter, a tiny guardhouse, and a watchtower. Yet on the composite map we have two larger structures next to each other. We will have to wait and see if the geophysical survey has revealed anything about the layout of these structures. If that is not the case, we can only hope that Sturdy Colls soon returns to the camp site to excavate the detected structural remains. 

All in all, the information revealed by these interviews about the findings of the 2011 geophysical survey at Treblinka provides us with more questions than answers. We can only wait and hope that a preliminary report on the research results is not too long in coming. One thing is sure, however, namely that little indicates that the findings of Caroline Sturdy Colls have actually “proven Holocaust deniers wrong” with regard to Treblinka. On the contrary: the information revealed seems to hint that the findings of Caroline Sturdy Colls may well spell the doom of the official historiography on Treblinka.

_____________________________________________________________________

[1] Thomas Kues, “UK Forensic Archeologist Sets Out To Refute Treblinka ‘Deniers’”,  http://www.revblog.codoh.info/2010/11/uk-forensic-archeologist-sets-out-to-refute-treblinka-deniers/

[2] “Mass graves at Nazi death camp Treblinka prove Holocaust deniers wrong”, http://www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/2012/01/16/mass-graves-at-nazi-death-camp-treblinka-holocaust_n_1208814.html

[3] This radio program is temporarily available at  http://www.bbc.co.uk/iplayer/episode/b019rlns/The_Hidden_Graves_of_the_Holocaust/

[4] http://www.ideaslab.bham.ac.uk/MP3s/Caroline_Sturdy_Colls_Treblinka_podcast.mp3 A transcript of this podcast can be found at http://www.ideaslab.bham.ac.uk/MP3s/Transcript_Predictor_Podcast_40.doc

[5] “Treblinka: Revealing the hidden graves of the Holocaust”, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/magazine-16657363

[6] Cf. Carlo Mattogno, Belzec in Propaganda, Testimonies, Archeological Research, and History, Theses & Dissertations Press, Chicago 2004, p. 73.

[7] Cf. Jürgen Graf, Thomas Kues, Carlo Mattogno, Sobibór: Holocaust Propaganda and Reality, TBR Books 2010, p. 120.

[8] Cf. ibid., p. 117.

[9] Cf. Jürgen Graf, Carlo Mattogno, Treblinka. Extermination Camp or Transit Camp?, Theses & Dissertations Press, Chicago 2004, p. 138.

[10] Discussed in detail in my article Chil Rajchman’s Treblinka Memoirs, Inconvenient History, vol. 2, nr. 1, online: http://www.inconvenienthistory.com/archive/2010/volume_2/number_1/chil_rajchmans_treblinka_memoirs.php

[11] Chil Rajchman, Treblinka. A Survivor’s Memory 1942–1943, MacLehose Press, London 2011, p. 60.

[12] Cf. Carlo Mattogno, Belzec or the Holocaust Controversy of Roberto Muehlenkamp, section 4.1. http://www.codoh.info/gcgv/gcgvhcrm.html

[13] Yitzhak Arad, Belzec, Sobibor, Treblinka. The Operation Reinhard Death Camps, Indiana University Press, Bloomington and Indianapolis 1987, p. 85.

[14] Judging by some of the early maps of the camp, pit #3 would have been located outside of this part of the camp, whereas some later exterminationist efforts to reconstruct the topography of the camp places it within the “death camp proper”, cf. Mapping Treblinka, http://www.deathcamps.org/treblinka/maps.html

[15] C. Mattogno, Belzec…, op.cit., p. 73.

[16] J. Graf, T. Kues, C. Mattogno, Sobibór…, op.cit., p. 120.

[17] Y. Arad, Belzec, Sobibor, Treblinka, op.cit., p. 87.

[18] Ibid., pp. 275-276.

[19] Dieter Pohl, “Massentötungen durch Giftgas im Rahmen der ‘Aktion Reinhardt’: Aufgaben der Forschung” in: Günter Morsch, Betrand Perz (eds.), Neue Studien zu nationalsozialistischen Massentötungen durch Giftgas. Historische Bedeutung, technische Entwicklung, revisionistische Leugnung, Metropol, Berlin 2011, p. 194.

[20] Cf. Y. Arad, Belzec, Sobibor, Treblinka, op.cit., pp. 87-88.

[21] According to the English-language Wikipedia article on Ground Penetrating Radar (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ground-penetrating_radar) “Good penetration is also achieved in dry sandy soils or massive dry materials such as granite, limestone, and concrete where the depth of penetration could be up to 15 m”, implying that the concrete slabs of the memorial in themselves should pose little problem for a GPR survey. There may of course be other, unrevealed hindering factors. 

[22] The Reconstruction of Treblinka, http://www.holocaust-history.org/Treblinka/

[23] http://www.holocaust-history.org/Treblinka/deathcampinternet/deathcampp7.shtml

[24] Y. Wiernik, A Year in Treblinka, chapter 3, online: http://www.zchor.org/treblink/wiernik.htm

[25] http://www.deathcamps.org/treblinka/pic/bmap9.jpg